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SUMMARY 
Because of their complexity and the unforgiving environment in which they operate, 
aerospace vehicles are vulnerable to mission-critical failures. In order to prevent these 
failures, aerospace vehicles often employ Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery (FDIR) 
systems to sense, identify the source of, and recover from faults. Typically, aerospace 
systems use a rule-based paradigm for FDIR where telemetry values are monitored against 
specific logical statements such as static upper and lower limits. The model-based 
paradigm allows more complex decision logic to be used for FDIR. State machines are a 
particular tool for model-based FDIR that have been explored by industry but not yet 
widely adopted. This study develops a generic and modular state machine FDIR 
architecture that is portable to flight software. The study will focus on FDIR for the 
Guidance, Navigation, & Control subsystem, but it will be presented in a manner that is 
applicable to all vehicle subsystems. The state machine formulation is applied for on-board 
model-based fault diagnosis. Two specific case studies are employed to demonstrate the 
architecture. The first is a terrestrial application of unmanned aerial vehicles for 3D 
scanning and mapping, which is validated through flight testing. The second is a space-
based application of automated close approach and capture for a Mars sample return 
mission, which is validated through software-in-the-loop testing with flight-like software 
components.
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION:                                                   
FAULT PROTECTION STATE-OF-THE-ART 
1.1 Motivation 
The capability to recover gracefully from hardware or software faults is critical for 
many aerospace applications. This is particularly true for autonomous missions involving 
proximity operations (ProxOps), where multiple vehicles are operating at close range. 
Previous ProxOps missions have experienced faults that resulted in a failure to meet 
mission objectives. For example, NASA’s Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous 
Technology (DART) spacecraft was designed to rendezvous with the Multiple Paths, 
Beyond-Line-of-Sight Communications (MUBLCOM) satellite in space and perform 
ProxOps maneuvers, as shown in Figure 1. DART experienced a mission failure when it 
collided with MUBLCOM during automated operations due to software errors that led to 
inaccurate range estimation. In a failure investigation report for DART, NASA 
recommended that “designers for such spacecraft should develop and adhere to a robust, 
detailed set of requirements for fault detection, isolation, and recovery in order to prevent 
a mishap” [1]. 
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Figure 1 – DART and MUBLCOMM performing ProxOps in space [1] 
In the development of aerospace systems, verification and validation (V&V) are 
often focused on demonstrating that software algorithms and systems will work under 
nominal conditions. The robustness of the system to off-nominal scenarios is often not 
tested. Even when system robustness is evaluated, it is difficult to evaluate all possible 
failure modes. As more missions undertake autonomous operations, there is an increased 
need for real-time prevention of failures through fault protection. These capabilities are 
especially necessary for time-critical operations such as rendezvous and ProxOps. Deep 
space proximity operations applications require advanced autonomy and fault protection 





Some standardized fault protection nomenclature has been established in the 
aerospace industry. Also, several key paradigms of fault protection have been developed. 
This section provides some insight into trends in fault protection practice.  
1.2.1 Key Definitions 
The NASA Fault Management Handbook defines a failure as “the unacceptable 
performance of an intended function,” while a fault is defined as “a physical or logical 
cause, which explains a failure” [2]. This distinction is important because while failures 
should be avoided, faults are often unavoidable. For example, system designers may not 
be able to prevent a sensor malfunction (a fault), but they can prevent this malfunction from 
becoming a catastrophic failure through the use of fault protection (FP). Thus, fault 
protection systems aim to perform a three-step process called Fault Detection, Isolation, 
and Recovery (FDIR) in order to prevent failures. Fault detection involves determining that 
something unexpected has occurred. Fault isolation (also connected to diagnosis) 
determines the possible source of a fault. Fault recovery is an action taken to attempt to 
retain or regain control of the system state and mitigate the impact of the fault. These 
activities often happen simultaneously and can take on various degrees of specificity. FDIR 
systems avoid the presence of both false positives (non-faults that trigger the detection 
system) and false negatives (faults that go undetected). These FDIR errors are illustrated 
in Table 1. 
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Table 1 – Terminology of true and false positive & negative fault detection [3] 
  Fault Detection 
  Positive Negative 
Ground truth 
Positive True positive False negative 
Negative False positive True negative 
1.2.2 Rule-Based Fault Protection Paradigm 
Over the past decade, the development of FDIR for space missions has advanced 
significantly. A typical aerospace FDIR system is “a smart embedded system that is able 
to react to some know[n] events and to select a decision among a predefined set” [4]. 
Currently, the state-of-the-art in spacecraft FDIR involves using a set of rules that are 
checked against telemetry. These telemetry monitors are searching for fault symptoms, 
“ranging from explicitly detected constraint violations, to unexpected hardware behavior, 
to excessive performance errors, to broken deadlines and more” [5]. Pre-programmed 
responses are executed when one of these rules is violated [6,7]. For example, if a 
parameter persistently exceeds its expected range an action is taken by the system, such as 
transitioning the vehicle into safe mode, stopping all normal mission tasks and turning off 
all non-essential hardware until ground operators can resolve the fault.  
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Figure 2 – Example of the rule-based fault protection paradigm 
Consider the scenario illustrated in Figure 2, where a sample telemetry dataset 
representing the Y position of the vehicle in meters is plotted against time in minutes. The 
rule shown in the yellow box indicates that a fault is detected if the value of Y drops below 
1 meter or exceeds 2.5 meters for more than 1 min. Around 0.75 min, a single data point 
exceeds the limit, however a fault is not detected because the 1 min persistence threshold 
is not exceeded. Around 1.75 min, the Y value violates the lower limit consistently and 
triggers a fault detection around 2.75 min.  
Of course, the case presented here is a simple example. Many combinations of 
logical rules are possible, and they are implemented in FDIR systems with increasing 
complexity. For example, the Dawn mission to explore the asteroid belt makes use of 
Relative Time Sequences (RTS) that are triggered in response to Telemetry Monitors 
(TMons) being tripped [8]. Each RTS can then enable, disable, or start other RTS’s and 
can enable or disable TMons. Dawn contains over 250 RTS and over 250 TMons, all of 
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which are documented in an Excel spreadsheet. The system is so complex that a model-
based SPIN model checker was used for V&V to ensure that it was constructed with logical 
soundness [8]. 
Another key component of the rule-based FP paradigm is the use of “safe mode”. 
If something goes wrong that cannot be solved onboard, the spacecraft will autonomously 
transition to safe mode. Safe mode involves stopping all normal mission tasks, turning off 
all non-essential hardware to conserve power, orienting the spacecraft in a favorable 
attitude (for thermal concerns, power generation, and communications), and waiting for 
commands from the ground to return the spacecraft to normal operation mode. These 
functions are shown in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3 – Typical changes to spacecraft functionality during Safe Mode 
A spacecraft should be able to survive in safe mode, but it will not be able to 
continue its mission until the problem is resolved on the ground and normal operations are 
restored. In this paradigm, detection of fault symptoms is usually mapped directly to a pre-
determined response sequence. In other words, fault diagnosis is performed by FP 
engineers at design time rather than by the system on-board in real-time. A typical sequence 
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for fault protection response is shown in Figure 4, with an example given for a camera 
power fault.  
 
Figure 4 – Typical Fault Protection response sequence 
Traditional Fault Protection proceeds in a hierarchical fashion [9], as shown in 
Table 2. First, a fault is detected inside a particular spacecraft hardware or software 
component and local corrections are attempted (Level 0). Next, the fault propagates up to 
subsystem software (Level 1). If subsystem software cannot resolve the fault, or if several 
faults occur simultaneously, then the system will be reconfigured (Level 2), such as 
switching to a full suite of redundant hardware. Failure of system control hardware or 
software, such as the flight computer that houses fault protection (Level 3) will also result 
in system reconfiguration. If multiple Level 2 or 3 failures or any major overall system 
failure occurs (Level 4), the spacecraft will transition into safe mode and rely on the ground 









Description Impact Fault Detection System Recovery 
Level 0 Unit Internal Failure without 
effects on 
performance 





Local in unit 
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Software 
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Hardware alarms 
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safe mode, wait 
for ground to 
recover system  
In addition, it should be noted that for critical events such as orbit insertion, flybys, 
entry, descent, and landing, or rendezvous & ProxOps, safe mode is often “disabled” 
because the spacecraft must maintain a “fail-operational” rather than “fail-safe” response 
from onboard FDIR systems [2]. The critical event sequences must be completed and 
cannot simply be paused if a fault occurs because of the risk of loss of vehicle or mission. 
Typically, autonomous FDIR systems will put the vehicle into safe mode when a fault is 
detected and await input from ground operators, as occurred with the Japanese Venus 
Climate Orbiter Akatsuki during orbit insertion [10]. If the vehicle enters safe mode during 
mission-critical times, such as Akatsuki’s orbit insertion, certain objectives may not be met. 
In the case of Aktsuki, the spacecraft failed to enter orbit. It is the presence of such critical 
events that motivates a need for greater FP autonomy, especially in highly complex 
interplanetary missions. The rule-based paradigm often cannot handle critical events in a 
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fail-operational manner when long signal time delays make ground controllers unable to 
respond to faults in a timely manner [9].  
The rule-based fault protection paradigm has been used successfully for decades 
and is fairly straightforward to understand and test. Rule-based systems can be pre-
programmed without anticipating every possible scenario. The rule-based paradigm is the 
current standard for spacecraft fault protection and is used extensively in industry because 
of its utility and ease of implementation. However, several problems with this paradigm 
have been identified by FDIR practitioners. Adding logical expressiveness to enable more 
advanced rules (such as adding different kinds of logical operators or enabling multiple 
logical conditions in each rule) adds complexity to the system, reduces ease of 
understanding for developers and reviewers, and vastly increases testing time [6,7].  An 
example of a complex rule from [6] is shown here: 
OBS_NODE != MODE_ASCENT && TWTA_VOLT_EU > 5.0 && RF_EPC_ST 
> 0x4A && RF_TWT_ST > 0x4A && (( BATT_PRES1_EU > 650.0 && 
BATT_PRES1_ST == MUX_AD_OK ) || ( BATT_PRESS2_EU > 650.0 && 
BATT_PRESS2_ST == MUX_AD_OK )) 
Also, ad hoc approaches can result in gaps and inefficiencies in overall FDIR design [11]. 
In real mission scenarios, it can be difficult to determine the meaning or the cause when a 
fault detection rule is triggered, and it is not always clear how to respond to rule triggers. 
For example, as one FP practitioner has said in [5]: 
“Fault management systems generally respond to problematic “errors”, as 
undesirable deviations, but there is little discrimination between deviations from 
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modeled behavior, deviations from predictions, deviations from objectives, or 
deviations from “nominal” or “safe” conditions (neither of which is well defined). 
Similarly, it is not clear, when a threshold is tripped, whether this reflects an 
assessment of system state (e.g., a device has failed), an objective violation (e.g., 
the device cannot perform some required function), or a control decision (e.g., 
something must be done about the failure). In conventional designs, it could be any 
or all of these, conflated and demoted to an inscrutable act of arithmetic.” 
Another FP researcher [9] states that:  
“Literature reports conventional FDIR methods suffering from significant 
shortcomings, like often missing isolation of faults and failures on-board, only 
partial observability of the actual system status and no on-board knowledge at all 
about the general operational capabilities of the system.”  
Finally, although FDIR responsibilities are similar on various missions, the 
implementation of FDIR systems (including logical rule statements) often does not carry 
over from previous missions [6]. While principles of FDIR design and lessons learned do 
sometimes carry over, spacecraft design teams tend to develop custom sets of FDIR rules 
and rule-based systems from scratch based upon the specific needs and requirements of 
each new mission. 
1.2.3 Model-Based Fault Protection Paradigm  
The use of a new paradigm called model-based fault protection has been explored 
and implemented in some scenarios. This paradigm uses a model of the flight system’s 
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behavior and selects the “state” of the system based on telemetry. Model-based 
architectures are necessarily state-based, because all models used for system control must 
be state-based [5]. Using behavior models of system state allows more complex and 
insightful decisions to be made by the autonomous system about fault determination and 
response.  
One space systems engineering team at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) has 
begun to analyze the FDIR problem in depth using model-based systems engineering 
approaches [11]. This team has developed an FDIR architecture using the SysML modeling 
language. Although this architecture is used for identifying, evaluating, and managing 
failure modes during the design and V&V phases, the implementation of FDIR for flight 
software (FSW) does not stem directly from the architecture. The example in Figure 5 
shows a model-based architecture of Guidance, Navigation, & Control (GN&C) failure 
modes for a generic Earth-orbiting satellite mission. Here GN&C activities (magenta) are 
connected to various failure modes (red), which could be related to a number of different 
possible causes (blue), and may result in various subsystem effects (yellow) and system-
level effects (orange). More recently, JPL has developed an ontology (formal technical 
vocabulary) for this kind of analysis, one important step toward enabling automated 
creation of traditional FP analyses such as Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), and Fault Containment Region (FCR) diagrams 
[12]. As mentioned in the previous section, the Dawn mission team at JPL also made use 
of a model-based logic checker during V&V of its FP system. A model of system behavior 
is required in order to perform checks of logic for consistency against specifications [8]. 
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Figure 5 – Example model-based fault protection architecture [11] 
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1.2.4 State Machine Logic and Applications 
The “state” of a system includes any “aspects of the system that we care about for 
the purposes of control” [13]. Traditionally, state variables have included continuous 
physical parameters such as position, velocity, attitude, temperature, and pressure. 
However, state variables can also include discrete quantities such as operating modes and 
device health. These discrete states can then be represented as state machines. State 
machines, or state charts, are a specific model-based tool used to represent complex logical 
relationships. They provide a visual block-diagram development that is fairly 
straightforward to understand and can be applied to fault protection [13]. Each block 
represents a specific state or sub-state of the system, and arrows between blocks represent 
transitions between states. A logical condition is associated with each transition, and if the 
condition associated with the transition becomes true, then the active state of the diagram 
will move from one state to another.  
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Figure 6 – Example usage of state machines for fault protection [13] 
The example state machine in Figure 6 shows the possible states of a camera power 
switch. There are two primary states of the switch, “Open” and “Closed”. Transitions 
between the states are activated when an “Open-cmd” or “Close-cmd” command is sent to 
the camera. Additional states and transitions such as “Tripped Open” (a fault state) and 
“Load overcurrent” (a root cause of the fault state) are added to illustrate a known fault 
condition of the system. Finally, fault states “Failed Open” and “Failed Closed” are added 
into the system, showing how the state machine can be used to implement fault detection. 
State machine representations may be significantly simpler than the actual physical 
or software processes they represent, which is why they are considered models. However, 
a state machine for FDIR purposes can be developed in a way that represents all possible 
states relevant to mission success. FP systems expressed in terms of system state will be 
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better able to protect the system in question [5]. Knowledge of the state is not the same as 
the state itself, and the status of a state machine representation at any time is only as 
accurate as the information that is provided to it. If input data is outdated or incorrect, the 
active state chosen by the state machine representation may be outdated or incorrect as 
well. Proper state knowledge always includes this resulting uncertainty [5]. 
Within MATLAB/Simulink, the Stateflow toolbox [14] provides a simple graphical 
interface for developing state machines, which can be used to represent the current state of 
different vehicle hardware or software components. Stateflow charts can be very simple, 
representing only a few possibilities, or they can involve numerous complicated nested sets 
of states. Transitions are indicated by blue arrows with Boolean conditions; if a condition 
registers as true, the transition will be activated to move from one state (or substate) to 
another. “Default” transitions specify the initial conditions of the diagram and are indicated 
by an arrow beginning at a dot and ending at the initial state or substate. Stateflow animates 
active states and transitions in dark blue during simulation so that the developer can 
monitor the simulation as it runs for debugging and confirmation that the chart is properly 
constructed.  
An example Stateflow chart representing a thruster controller developed for the 
Prox-1 small satellite mission [15] is shown in Figure 7. This chart contains three states 
(Startup, ThrustOff, ThrustOn), transition conditions between the states, and an embedded 
function “fuel_check” written in MATLAB syntax. The chart determines whether the 
thruster should be on or off based on whether the controller has received a command to fire 
(“ready”), the amount of time commanded (“time”), and whether sufficient fuel is available 
(determined by the output “enough_fuel” from the MATLAB function). 
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Figure 7 – Sample Stateflow chart representing a thruster controller [15] 
The Stateflow chart is integrated within a Simulink model as a Stateflow block with 
inputs and outputs, as shown in Figure 8. Stateflow logic allows complex decisions to be 
made in a hierarchical way, where conditions and logical states in individual spacecraft 
components, FDIR algorithms, and higher level “master” FSW mode logic all influence 
one another. 
 
Figure 8 – Example of Stateflow block integration in Simulink [15] 
Several space mission teams have made use of the Stateflow toolbox in 
MATLAB/Simulink [14] to develop FDIR algorithms as state machines. These algorithms 
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are then converted into C/C++ code using a process called “autocoding.” Missions that 
have autocoded FDIR algorithms from MATLAB/Simulink into FSW include Deep Space 
1 [16] and Deep Impact [17]. NASA’s Johnson Space Center has used 
MATLAB/Simulink, including Stateflow, to develop algorithms for GN&C, which are 
later autocoded into FSW [18]. JPL has also developed an open-source Statechart 
Autocoder that converts state machines from the Unified Modeling Language (UML) 
format to C/C++ [19]. Stateflow has been used to evaluate errors in FDIR algorithms during 
spacecraft system V&V [20]. Another FDIR architecture developed with Stateflow uses 
model-based design techniques to bring V&V earlier in the design cycle by providing a 
link between subsystem design and FDIR design [21]. Finally, JPL has developed an 
ontology for enabling formal description and specification of state-based system behavior, 
which includes modeling using state machines [22]. 
State machines offer several advantages over the rule-based FP paradigm. One 
significant advantage is the generation of a graphical product that is easier for designers, 
peer reviewers, and managers to understand and review. Other advantages include ease of 
accounting for subsystem interdependencies and implementing sequences with several 
decision points and/or path-dependent responses. The Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab 
(APL) conducted a formal trade study to determine whether their “ExecSpec” state-based 
fault protection system [6,7] or a more traditional rule-based system was more 
advantageous using the Solar Probe Plus mission as a case study [23]. They found that both 
methods were able to equivalently express all desired fault protection rules but that the 
state machine system is favored based on some of the advantages mentioned above. 
However, APL ultimately chose to continue using the rule-based system due to its 
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extensive flight heritage.  A direct comparison showing the same FP logic implemented in 
both a rule-based and a state-based system is shown in Figure 9 and Figure 10, as originally 
published by APL [6].  This logic was used to monitor a radio frequency amplifier in the 
Solar TErrestrial RElations Observatory (STERO). Note how much more readily the 
graphical state machine can be interpreted and checked for accuracy.
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Figure 9 – Rule-Based Fault Management of STEREO Radio Frequency Amplifier [6] 
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Figure 10 – State-Based Fault Management of STEREO Radio Frequency Amplifier [6] 
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1.2.5 Goal-Based Autonomy Paradigm 
Although this dissertation will not utilize it directly, an introduction to goal-based 
autonomy is appropriate at this point. FP is actually a subset of system autonomy, and goal-
based methods are an area of current research in spacecraft autonomy. A goal-based 
architecture uses objectives to control an autonomous system rather than directly 
commanding all actions in sequences of linear commands. An objective “is nothing more 
or less than a model of desired changes of state in the system under control” so that “a goal-
based architecture is necessarily state-based as well” [5]. One key goal-based autonomy 
platform is Remote Agent [24], which was deployed as a technology demonstration (not as 
the primary control software) on the Deep Space 1 mission. Although goal-based 
architectures can be used for FDIR, they are inherently full-system autonomy architectures 
and are thus out of the scope of this dissertation. 
1.2.6 On-Board Model-Based Fault Diagnosis 
Fault diagnosis is usually performed by FDIR engineers at design time, and the 
detection of a specific symptom is directly mapped to the appropriate response for the pre-
diagnosed fault. Though not typical for space missions, on-board fault diagnosis has been 
an area of research since the 1990s. One researcher [5] states that: 
“Error monitors in general tend to have…problems when errors are not interpreted 
through models or correlated and reconciled with other evidence. When such a 
diagnostic layer is absent, and responses are triggered directly by monitor events, 
it becomes hard to put one’s finger on what exactly a system believes it is 
responding to.” 
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This reflects the ad hoc nature of pre-programmed responses triggered directly by 
fault symptom detection. According to one FDIR overview paper, model-based fault 
diagnosis is considered a structured and mature field of research and many methods have 
been proposed and discussed in the control community [9]. One extensive survey of model-
based fault diagnosis methods discusses various mathematical control/estimation methods 
for aeronautical vehicles [25]. Remote Agent featured model-based “mode identification” 
and “mode reconfiguration” for fault diagnosis, which identify components whose failures 
explain detected anomalies [24]. Cassini’s Attitude Control Fault Protection is one of the 
few examples of a system where on-board fault diagnosis was performed in-flight [26,27]. 
One method for on-board diagnosis that has been used in research studies is called 
constraint suspension. It has been used to diagnose which component of a system is faulty 
[28,29]. 
1.3 Contributions of This Investigation 
This dissertation analyzes the FDIR problem for aerospace vehicles in the generic 
sense, focusing on the GN&C subsystem. The complexity, ubiquity, and autonomous 
nature of GN&C makes it a relevant example case for exploring fault protection advances 
that apply across all subsystems for many different aerospace applications. This 
investigation results in three key contributions that advance the state-of-the art in aerospace 
FDIR. 
1.3.1 Generic Fault Protection Architecture 
Contribution 1: Develop a generic, modular, and portable FDIR architecture that can be 
used for the GN&C subsystem on a wide variety of aerospace missions and vehicles. 
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Many missions build custom fault protection systems from the ground up while 
adapting principles from previous missions. Also, FDIR is often a specialized task 
performed by systems engineers after mission and vehicle design has been completed. This 
contribution aims to develop a generic architecture that is applicable to any type of 
aerospace vehicle or mission. A modular architecture is built with components that can be 
easily added, removed, or rearranged, allowing system design and FDIR design to be 
completed in parallel. This moves FDIR development earlier in the flight project lifecycle, 
thus allowing FDIR to influence system design and to be validated during system-level 
testing. The FDIR architecture is also portable to FSW. In other words, it is straightforward 
to convert the design implementation derived from the architecture for a particular mission 
to code that is used onboard the vehicle. The scope of the architecture in this study focuses 
on GN&C, but it is be presented in a manner that is applicable to all vehicle subsystems. 
1.3.2 On-Board Model-Based Diagnosis 
Contribution 2: Use a state machine formulation of the generic FDIR architecture to 
perform on-board model-based fault diagnosis. 
Although the model-based paradigm for fault protection has been explored by 
industry, it has not yet been widely adopted. This study focuses on the state machine 
approach to model-based FDIR, which has been used in several flight projects and research 
studies because it is intuitive, logic-based, and simple to interpret visually. State-of-the-art 
fault protection practice involves monitoring telemetry or sensor data of an aerospace 
system for symptoms of faults such as upper or lower limit violations. Diagnosis is usually 
performed by FDIR engineers at design time, and the detection of a specific symptom is 
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directly mapped to the appropriate response for the pre-diagnosed fault. This study 
advances the state-of-the-art in state-based fault protection by developing an on-board 
diagnostic system that assesses symptoms, isolates fault sources (while accounting for 
uncertainty), and selects corrective actions based on models of system behavior. 
1.3.3 UAV and Space-Based ProxOps Applications 
Contribution 3: Adapt the state machine FDIR architecture for terrestrial unmanned aerial 
vehicle and space-based proximity operations fault protection applications. 
To demonstrate the applicability of the state machine FDIR architecture to realistic 
scenarios from a wide variety of aerospace vehicles and missions, two applications are 
explored in very different domains. Each of these applications makes use of GN&C and 
undergoes V&V. The first is a terrestrial application involving the use of multi-rotor 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for 3D scanning and mapping. This application 
undergoes V&V through flight testing. The second application is a space-based scenario 
involving automated rendezvous and ProxOps for orbital capture in a Mars Sample Return 
mission. This application undergoes V&V through software-in-the-loop (SITL) testing in 
a flight-like spacecraft software simulation environment. 
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CHAPTER 2. THEORY:                                                                 
GENERIC FAULT PROTECTION ARCHITECTURE 
 The study presented here advances the state-of-the-art in FDIR and builds on 
previous work by bringing together capabilities such as model-based design and 
autocoding to FSW into a single generic, modular FDIR architecture that is portable to 
FSW. This architecture also features model-based on-board fault diagnosis using state 
machines. While most previous FDIR implementations have involved large, high-resource 
missions with custom-built FDIR, the proposed architecture is designed to be applicable to 
a wide variety of platforms and missions. The architecture also allows alternate 
configurations that enable testing of various scenarios. 
2.1 FDIR Architecture Concept Overview 
 The FDIR architecture collects data from the vehicle which is used to determine the 
likely state of the vehicle. This state can be classified as either “fault” or “no fault” based 
on how the decision logic is structured. The architecture isolates faults by performing 
diagnosis to determine their precise source and performs preventative actions to recover 
from faults before they become mission-critical failures. Outputs from the architecture can 
either send commands to the vehicle autonomously or notify ground operators to take 
corrective action. 
2.1.1 FDIR Architecture Requirements 
At the beginning of this study, high-level requirements were identified to guide the 
development of this FDIR architecture: it must be generic, modular, and portable to FSW. 
A generic architecture is applicable to any type of aerospace vehicle or mission. A modular 
architecture allows components to be easily rearranged, added, or removed. A portable 
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architecture means that it is straightforward to convert the design implementation derived 
from the architecture for a particular mission to code that is used onboard the vehicle. 
In addition to the three primary requirements of generic, modular, and portable, 
additional guidelines for the architecture were also established. V&V of the FDIR 
architecture should assess its capability to meet the following goals. It should detect and 
possibly correct software and hardware faults at multiple levels: component, subsystem, 
and system. These faults may include sensor/actuator malfunctions, errors or degradation, 
improper controller gain settings, non-convergence of GN&C algorithms, and avionics 
software or processor hardware faults. The architecture should detect and avoid mission-
level failure modes, such as vehicle collision or uncontrolled behavior that renders the 
mission objectives unattainable. Faults should be detected, diagnosed, and corrected in 
real-time onboard as they occur, not in post-processing or by operators examining data on 
the ground. 
The architecture should utilize model-based decision logic rather than the rule-
based paradigm. Model-based approaches allow the system to select the best course of 
action when multiple options exist. Finally, the architecture should demonstrate FP logic 
that allows the system to avoid aborts by responding to correctible errors in real-time to 
meet mission objectives. Because different missions have different risk classes (A,B,C,D) 
[30], the architecture should scale to meet the requirements of the mission. 
2.1.2 Development Environment in MATLAB/Simulink 
The architecture discussed in this study leverages the development of a Six-Degree-
of-Freedom (6DOF) simulation environment for the Prox-1 small satellite mission and 
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several other projects at Georgia Tech. The simulation environment models in-flight 
conditions of actual vehicles and missions and contains environment and hardware models 
with configurable settings. The original purpose of this MATLAB/Simulink platform was 
for Prox-1 GN&C algorithm integration and testing [15,31] and it has been used for 
feasibility studies of constellations of CubeSats at Mars [32] and a Processor-in-the-Loop 
testbed for high-fidelity testing of avionics boards for relative proximity operations called 
SoftSim6D [33]. Functionality has been added to the simulation environment that can be 
applied generally to aerospace mission scenarios to test a variety of FDIR algorithms and 
mission architectures.  
2.1.3 Enabling Advances in FDIR 
The primary area of applicability of this architecture to the NASA Technology Area 
Breakdown Structure is element 4.5.1 System Health Management under section 4.5 
System Level Autonomy within Technology Area 04: Robotics and Autonomous Systems. 
System health management “monitors, predicts, detects, and diagnoses faults and 
accommodates or mitigates the effects either on-board or through telemetry processing on 
the ground” [34]. The FDIR architecture results in on-board real-time system health 
management software and will address many of the desired technical capabilities of 
element 4.5.1. For example, complex logic allows the FDIR architecture to include 
prognostic and diagnostic components as an integral part of the system. The logic is also 
able to take complicated vehicle states into account to avoid false positives when faults are 
not present and false negatives when faults are present. It may even be used to anticipate 
faults and adapt to new situations that do not have pre-programmed responses. Finally, this 
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study advances paradigm-shifting model-based approaches for FDIR that can be easily 
transitioned to FSW and validated using SITL and flight testing for V&V. 
2.2 FDIR Architecture Characteristics 
This section focuses on explaining how the architecture meets the primary 
requirements of generic, modular, and portable. The architecture itself are described in the 
following section. 
2.2.1 Generic 
A generic architecture is applicable to any type of aerospace vehicle or mission. The 
FDIR architecture is comprised primarily of five generic diagrams that are described in the 
following section. The MATLAB/Simulink simulation environment in which the 
architecture is developed allows setting vehicle parameters including physical dimensions 
and trajectory. It is applicable to a multitude of possible mission scenarios and permits 
alternate configurations, such as individual vehicles or multiple cooperative or non-
cooperative vehicles. The simulation environment also contains generic modules for 
commonly used components such as sensors and actuators. The simulation environment 
has previously been adapted for use with many scenarios, missions, and vehicles, including 
the Prox-1 small satellite mission [15,31], various ProxOps scenarios with hardware such 
as a modular attitude determination system CubeSat avionics board [33], and a Mars 
communication relay CubeSat constellation [32]. Each of the five diagrams described in 
the following section are implemented without focusing on any particular application or 
vehicle. Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate how the architecture can be adapted for two distinct 
and very different applications. While the generic architecture presented here is focused 
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particularly on FDIR for faults related to the GN&C subsystem, the same principles and 
design can be applied to any other faults and subsystems on an aerospace vehicle. 
2.2.2 Modular 
A modular architecture allows components to be easily added, removed, or 
rearranged. The visual block diagram environment offered by MATLAB/Simulink can be 
altered and reconfigured easily and allows for testing of many combinations of software 
modules and hardware components. For example, the investigator could replace the 
sensor/actuator suite and GN&C software modules. An example of such a reconfiguration 
is shown in Figure 11 and Figure 12, where an image generation (ImageGen) block is added 
to the generic sensor suite. This block allows generation of simulated images from visual 
and infrared sensors used during ProxOps. 
Also, various initial conditions, environmental scenarios, and physical vehicle 
properties can be easily redefined in a MATLAB initialization script and edited or 
rearranged in Simulink. These include spacecraft orbit and attitude dynamics, spacecraft 
properties such as mass properties and outer mold line, relative dynamics for multiple 
spacecraft, sensor and actuator properties such as field of view and resolution, GN&C 
software components, and central body or environment properties. Parameters for FDIR 
algorithms can also be adjusted, such as fault injection times, wait times, and trigger 
thresholds. The five diagrams described in the following sections can also be easily 




Figure 11 – Generic sensor suite (before reconfiguration) 
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Figure 12 – Generic sensor suite (after reconfiguration) with ImageGen Sensor Model added 
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2.2.3 Portable 
A portable architecture allows straightforward conversion of its design 
implementation for a particular mission to code that is used onboard the vehicle. The FDIR 
architecture allows rapid transition from development to flight. The computational 
requirements of the FDIR architecture match the capability generally available on flight 
processors. The architecture has the ability to make the kinds of complex decisions 
normally required for autonomous FSW and is evaluated by testing its response to realistic 
conditions rather than “canned” scenarios. It is well integrated with other hardware and 
software components, allowing new components to be quickly evaluated. Finally, the 
architecture features the capability to easily convert the architecture into FSW code via 
autocoding, a process which has been used with the Prox-1 mission as described in [15]. 
In this process, algorithms developed in MATLAB/Simulink are converted to C code and 
integrated with other FSW code in C. Autocode performance is validated via a “day in the 
life” test in a testbed using flight hardware. Although the autocoding process is not 
demonstrated directly in this study, technical memos written by the Prox-1 team are 
included in Appendix A to provide guidance for future researchers or engineers desiring to 
reproduce it. Many FDIR algorithms have been developed by other researchers for 
hardware and software faults, and the architecture developed in this work enables these 
algorithms to be rigorously tested and implemented. This will greatly facilitate the 




2.3 Generic Architecture Diagrams 
 The FDIR architecture presented in this study is made up primarily of five generic 
diagrams: a GN&C subsystem taxonomy, fault tree analysis, functional state machine, 
diagnostic state machine, and FDIR architecture block diagram. Each of these diagrams is 
described in detail in this section. 
2.3.1 Generic GN&C Subsystem Taxonomy 
To prepare for the development of the FDIR architecture, it is useful to develop a 
generic taxonomy of aerospace vehicle subsystems. Subsystems such as telemetry, tracking 
& control (TT&C), electrical power subsystem (EPS), structures and mechanical systems 
(S&MS), and GN&C each have many hardware and software components that could 
manifest faults. Because aerospace vehicle systems are quite complicated, it is useful for 
FDIR designers to focus more effort on subsystems that are historically prone to fault by 
examining anomaly trends [35]. One study by the Aerospace Corporation found that among 
twenty Earth-orbiting vehicles, GN&C accounted for 40% of failures, EPS accounted for 
40%, TT&C accounted for 10%, and S&MS accounted for 10% [36]. GN&C is often 
highlighted as a failure-prone subsystem and thus provides an appropriate scope of focus 
for the FDIR architecture. The generic subsystem taxonomy in Figure 13 shows the various 
high-level systems in an aerospace mission, a generic set of vehicle subsystems, and the 
typical components of an aerospace vehicle GN&C subsystem. Only the GN&C subsystem 
is expanded here because it is the focus of this study. Each of the other subsystem blocks 




Figure 13 – Generic aerospace vehicle GN&C subsystem taxonomy
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Almost all aerospace vehicles are reliant upon ground support systems, which range 
from a laptop and antenna for uploading commands to a UAV to communications ground 
stations and mission control centers for space missions. Many vehicles (including 
terrestrial ones) also depend on space-based assets such as the Global Positioning System 
(GPS) satellite constellation, communication relay systems, or weather satellites. 
Vehicle systems include hardware and software components that are integrated into 
the vehicle. The GN&C subsystem is responsible for both attitude and translational motion 
of the vehicle. Guidance algorithms are responsible for planning where the vehicle should 
move or rotate. Navigation algorithms use sensors to determine the attitude state (including 
angular velocity and acceleration) and translational state (absolute and relative position, 
velocity, and acceleration) of the vehicle. Control algorithms use actuators to command the 
vehicle to perform both attitude and translational maneuvers. Finally, GN&C mode logic 
and decision software is used to manage each of these components based on the current 
mission phase, as well as to parse commands from ground operators. 
2.3.2 Generic Fault Tree Analysis 
One important quality of fault protection systems is that they should be designed in 
a way that all reasonably probable fault scenarios are considered and addressed. In addition 
to enumerating the various components that make up a system, it is necessary to determine 
potential sources of faults that may impact the system. It is important for mission and 
vehicle designers to “use historical data to determine what fault types are most likely to be 
introduced or … perform a risk analysis to determine what fault types would be most 
devastating if overlooked” [37]. 
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One critical tool used to identify potential faults is called fault tree analysis (FTA). 
FTA allows system designers to identify key failure points based on the requirements and 
specifications of the system. An FTA provides a systematic top-down symbolic approach 
to model chains of possible faults for a given system [38]. The fault tree is made up of a 
top level event, which is a foreseeable, “undesirable event toward which all fault tree logic 
paths flow” [39]. Each key failure event is then traced back using conditional logical 
operators (such as AND and OR) to identify all possible basic fault events that could lead 
to that top-level failure event. The top event is connected to various intermediate events 
that could cause it. In turn, each intermediate event is connected to other intermediate 
events that could cause it. The bottom level is comprised of basic events or root cause 
events. These are initiating events whose cause is not analyzed further. Events are 
connected by AND and OR logic gates. OR implies that each one of the connected 
causative events is both necessary and sufficient for the resulting event to occur, even if 
none of the other events occur. AND implies that all connected causative events must occur 
and together form the necessary and sufficient condition for the resulting event. Although 
other logical operators are possible, most fault trees can be constructed with only the AND 
and OR symbols [38]. The result is a fault tree that identifies all basic fault events that 
should be considered by a fault protection system. 
Previous literature has developed a “Fault Tree to State Machine” algorithm to 
transform a fault tree into a “fault state machine” that tracks the off-nominal (or “hazard”) 
states of a system [40].  This is distinct from a “functional state machine” that tracks all 
possible states of a system. The algorithm also has the capability to map states and 
transitions of the fault state machine to states and transitions of the functional state 
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machine. If a functional state machine of the system is available, the fault state machine 
can be linked to specific system states and transitions, which are based on the hardware 
and software status of the system. This is preferable to the traditional rule-based approach 
because it allows the design of the fault state machine to be explicitly linked to the fault 
tree analysis and ensure that no fault conditions are missed unintentionally. 
A generic fault tree analysis is shown in Figure 14.  In this analysis, the top level 
failure is assumed to occur if any of the 2nd level events occur, as indicated by the OR gate. 
Each 2nd level events is in turn caused by any of the 3rd level basic events below it. For 
example, one of the 2nd level events, “Environmental Fault” can be caused by either 3rd 
level basic events or the lone 3rd level intermediate event “Physical Environment Fault”, 
which in turn is caused by one of the 4th level basic events such as “Radiation Event” or 
“Debris Event”. Each basic event can be mapped to a specific component of the vehicle or 
mission and assigned a probability if a quantitative failure analysis is desired. 
2.3.3 Generic Functional State Machine 
As mentioned in the previous section, a functional state machine is a model that 
describes the behavior of a system by tracking the “mode state” of the system [40]. Mode 
states are high level descriptions of the overall system behavior and are distinct from 
dynamic states (such as position & velocity) or vehicle component states (such as battery 
level or processor temperature). Each vehicle and mission will have a distinct state machine 
describing how these modes change and the logical conditions to switch between them.  
The generic functional state machine shown in Figure 15 provides a template for 
constructing this diagram.  It features generic modes that may be present in many different 
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Figure 15 – Generic functional state machine
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contexts. The initial state in the bottom left is “Standby,” which is a passively safe mode 
where the vehicle waits for further commands to proceed. 
If no faults have been detected (FaultDetectedMode=0) then a command 
(BeginComplexProcess=1) allows a “complex process” to begin. Complex processes 
could include autonomous or piloted operations. An optional transition phase occurs before 
the complex process state begins. The complex process has several sub-states. First is 
“Standoff” (ArriveAtStandoff=1), which is a phase where the complex process is 
“armed” but not initiated and the vehicle is awaiting permission to proceed. Standoff is 
distinct from Standby because the vehicle may not necessarily be in a passively safe 
dynamic state. If no faults are detected (FaultDetectedMode=0) the complex process 
begins when a command is provided (ReadyToGo=1). At this point the NominalZone 
state begins. This is a nominal region where faults are acceptable and can generally be 
detected and responded to safely while still continuing nominal operations.   
At some point, based on the dynamic state of the system, safe operation under fault 
conditions may no longer be possible (EnterAbortZone=1). When this occurs, the 
AbortZone state begins, and at any time if a fault detection is triggered or a human operator 
decides conditions are unsafe, an Abort can be commanded (Abort=1). The abort stops 
the complex process and moves the vehicle to a safe dynamic state, eventually returning to 
the Standby state (ArriveAtStandby=1). Additionally, an “Interact” state allows the 
vehicle to interact with other vehicles, target objects, or the environment. A pre-interaction 
region called the InteractZone is entered from the AbortZone when 
(EnterInteractZone=1). The Interact state can be entered from either AbortZone or 
InteractZone when a command is received (BeginInteraction=1). The vehicle 
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cannot enter the Interact state directly from NominalZone because interaction almost 
always involves hazardous conditions. If a fault or other hazard occurs during Interact, an 
abort can be triggered (Abort=1). If no anomalies occur, the vehicle will return to 
passively safe standby after the interaction is complete (ArriveAtStandby=1). 
2.3.4 Generic Diagnostic State Machine 
To implement on-board model-based fault diagnosis, the generic diagnostic state 
machine shown in Figure 16 has been developed. The diagnostic state machine consists of 
two primary states: NoFaultDetected and FaultDetected. During all nominal mission 
phases, NoFaultDetected is activated, but when a fault detection trigger is observed 
(FaultDetected=1), the FaultDetected state will be activated. If the functional state 
machine is in any state other than AbortZone, then the diagnostic state machine will enter 
“Diagnose” immediately when a fault is detected. If the functional state machine is in the 
Abort Region (AbortZone=1) when a fault is detected, the diagnostic state machine does 
not attempt to determine which fault has occurred. An abort maneuver is commanded 
immediately, returning the vehicle to a passively safe dynamic condition before entering 
the Diagnose state. 
The Diagnose state consists of sub-states for each possible fault. Each sub-state 
begins by running a diagnostic routine to determine if that particular fault has occurred. If 
the diagnostic routine returns FaultConfirmed=1, then the appropriate fault response 
routine is called and the diagnostic sub-state for the next fault is activated while the 
response runs in the background. If the diagnosis does not result in fault confirmation 
within a user-defined wait time, then the active sub-state moves to the next possible fault 
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Figure 16 – Generic diagnostic state machine 
 43 
and the process repeats. Once all possible faults have been evaluated, the active sub-state 
returns to the first fault until the fault has been resolved by one of the corrective actions. 
Note that fault diagnostic checks are distinct from fault detection checks. None of 
the diagnostic checks are performed unless they are called by the diagnostic state machine, 
which is only activated once the fault detection triggers are activated. Thus, a fault will not 
be detected if one of the fault diagnosis conditions is met but the fault detection conditions 
have not been met. Once a fault has been diagnosed, the diagnostic state machine calls the 
appropriate fault response routine. When the fault is resolved and a user-specified recovery 
time has passed, the active state returns to the NoFaultDetected state. 
2.3.5 Generic Architecture Block Diagram 
The functional state machine and diagnostic state machine described in the previous 
two sections are designed to work together in the fault protection architecture along with 
several additional components in the MATLAB/Simulink environment. An overview 
showing the architecture components and their connections is illustrated by the block 
diagram in Figure 17. The diagram is divided into the system under control (entity being 
controlled) and the control system (entity exercising the control) according to the 
terminology defined in [5].  
During initial development and testing, the system under control is composed of 
simulation models and state variables that track the status of these models. For example, 
environment models keep track of time systems, dynamic perturbations on the vehicle, and 
ephemerides for the positions of planets, moons, and the Sun. Environment states include  
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the current time, atmospheric and temperature conditions, and eclipse/occultation status for 
planets and moons. The simulation environment also includes vehicle dynamic models for 
inertial and relative translational dynamics (position, velocity, acceleration) and inertial 
attitude dynamics, including angular velocity and acceleration. Generic vehicle 
sensor/instruments and actuator/propulsion models are also included in simulation to 
provide sensor outputs and receive actuator inputs based on the state of the simulation. Other 
vehicle components and their health status can also be accounted for.  Again, these 
simulation models are only a development tool and are not used as part of the on-board 
software system for the FDIR architecture when it is deployed on a flight computer. 
The “Control System” contains the core of the FDIR architecture as well as vehicle 
GN&C algorithms and state estimates. The GN&C algorithms include sensor data 
processing and filters for estimating vehicle position, velocity, attitude, and angular velocity 
and guidance & control algorithms for both vehicle trajectory and vehicle attitude. The fault 
& mode portions of the architecture are the main focus of this study, and these components 
are shown in the example Simulink diagram in Figure 18, which illustrates how each of the 
components interacts with the others.  
The two primary components are the functional state machine and the diagnostic state 
machine. These are Stateflow blocks which have been described in the previous two 
sections. Most of the inputs to the functional state machine are produced by the generic 
mode management block, a MATLAB function which takes in vehicle state information and 
ground commands and calculates the logical variables that are evaluated in functional state 
machine transitions. One output from the functional state machine to the diagnostic state 
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Figure 18 – Simulink diagram for generic fault protection architecture 
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machine (AbortZone) describes whether the AbortZone state is active. Two inputs 
(FaultDetectedMode and Abort) are generated by the diagnostic state machine. 
The inputs to the diagnostic state machine come from several sources. One variable 
(ArriveAtStandby) is generated by the mode management MATLAB function block. 
Another variable (AbortZone) is generated by the functional state machine. Fault 
detection checks are performed by a MATLAB function block and result in two variables 
(FaultDetected and FaultResolved). Two variables are input as constants 
(WaitTime and RecoverTime), and a set of variables indicating fault confirmation 
(FaultConfirmed1,2,3, etc.) are input from the fault diagnosis/resolution 
MATLAB function block for each fault. Two output commands for each fault 
(Diagnose1,2,3, etc. and CorrectiveAction1,2,3, etc.) are fed into the 
respective fault diagnosis/resolution function blocks. Note that only one 
diagnosis/resolution function is shown for clarity but most systems will consider more than 
one fault and will have a diagnosis/resolution function for each fault. 
2.4 Mapping the Generic Architecture to a Particular Application 
Each of the generic architecture diagrams described in the preceding section can be 
adapted for particular applications. This section presents a general process for mapping 
from generic to specific, and the following two chapters provide examples for two very 
different applications. It is important to note that the generic diagrams provide more or less 
detail than necessary, depending on the application. Detail can be added or removed in 
each diagram as needed. 
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The first step in adaptation is to adjust the generic aerospace vehicle subsystem 
taxonomy in Figure 13 to the specific vehicle being considered. The goal is not to provide 
scrupulous detail of every miniscule component but instead to identify and categorize the 
main components that may have an impact on tasks and processes relevant to fault 
protection. The engineer must use their judgement to determine the level of granularity 
required, but in general a component-level taxonomy should be sufficient. Subsystems and 
GN&C components can be added or removed from the generic taxonomy as needed. 
Although this diagram is not used directly to generate other aspects of the overall 
architecture, it provides an extremely useful reference for standardizing terminology and 
vehicle configuration. 
The next step involves performing a fault tree analysis for the application. The 
template in the generic fault tree in Figure 14 can be used as a guide for this, or the fault 
tree structure can be followed without using the same intermediate and root cause events. 
Additionally, other industry standard analyses such as the Failure Modes, Effects, and 
Criticality Analysis (FMECA) or Fault Containment Regions (FCR) can be developed [12]. 
An important step in this process is determining which faults are considered credible and 
must be addressed by a FP system and which faults can be ignored as accepted risks. 
Quantitative risk metrics are useful for this purpose but are beyond the scope of this study. 
Next, a functional state machine should be created, using the generic functional state 
machine in Figure 15 as a template. This can be done in Stateflow, a state machine toolbox 
within MATLAB/Simulink, or in alternate software tool such as UML/MagicDraw. Some 
states from the generic diagram such as TransferToComplexProcess, Abort, and Interact 
may not be relevant for all applications, and some applications may require that additional 
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states be added. Transition conditions between states can also be modified, added, or 
removed as needed. The main purpose of this diagram is for other aspects of the FDIR 
architecture such as the diagnostic state machine to reference the mode state of the vehicle. 
Additionally, supporting functions such as the mode management MATLAB block should 
be written to generate the logical inputs used in transitions between states. Although 
alternate representations of mode state (such as simple code functions or Simulink blocks) 
can also be used, the state machine paradigm provides a useful graphical tool that should 
be relatively straightforward to interpret without intimate knowledge of the system.  
A diagnostic state machine should also be developed from the template in Figure 16 
using selected faults from the fault tree. The behavior of fault responses during the 
AbortZone should be determined, as this is reflected in the diagnostic state machine. Also, 
supporting functions for fault detection, diagnosis, and response should be written to 
provide inputs to and receive commands from the diagnostic state machine. These 
functions can be placed in MATLAB code blocks and connected to the functional and 
diagnostic state machines as shown in Figure 18. 
Finally, a V&V method such as a numerical simulation, testbed, or flight test should 
be should be developed to evaluate the FP architecture using the template shown in the 
block diagram in Figure 17. The block diagram should be adapted to the particular 
application as a reference for understanding how all components interact. Creating this 
diagram also helps the developer to determine if any important components have been left 
out. Once the FP architecture has been thoroughly evaluated, it is ready to be deployed. 
The following two chapters provide examples of this process for both a terrestrial UAV 
application and a space-based automated proximity operations application.  
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CHAPTER 3. TERRESTRIAL APPLICATION:                     
FALCONVIZ UAV NERVOUS SYSTEM 
One application of the state machine FDIR architecture has been developed for a 
multirotor UAV system. This has been dubbed the “UAV Nervous System,” and serves as 
a proof of concept of the state machine FDIR architecture. Several flight tests 
demonstrating successful detection of faults have been completed. The results of one set of 
flight tests were published at the 67th International Astronautical Congress in Guadalajara, 
Mexico [41]. 
3.1 Overview of FalconViz UAV Hardware and Typical Missions 
 FalconViz is a start-up company based out of the King Abdullah University of 
Science and Technology (KAUST) in Saudi Arabia. It was founded in 2015 by two 
research faculty and a PhD student at KAUST: Dr. Neil Smith, Dr. Mohamad Shalaby, and 
Luca Passone. FalconViz designs and flies custom UAVs for a variety of applications such 
as aerial surveying & mapping, inspection & monitoring, and surveillance. The company 
also collaborates with other research groups at KAUST such as the Hydrology, Agriculture 
and Land Observation (HALO) group led by Dr. Matthew McCabe. The HALO group uses 
modeling, remote sensing, and in-situ measurements to better understand elements such as 
water usage, crop health, and regional climate conditions. One effort of the HALO group 
involves the use of UAVs to capture thermal and hyperspectral imagery of desert 
agricultural plots. 
 At KAUST during Summer 2016, a FalconViz hexacopter (six rotors) shown in 
Figure 19 was used as a proof-of-concept testbed for the UAV Nervous System. One 
specific fault was addressed as a starting point: unbalanced propellers (leading to excess 
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vibration). Detecting this fault provides a more reliable vehicle for performing aerial 
surveys and other tasks with FalconViz UAVs. Additional modifications and flight tests 
were performed during Summer 2017 to add more vibration sensors and the capability to 
detect additional faults using temperature, voltage, and current sensors. 
Figure 19 – FalconViz hexacopter in flight [41] 
3.2 UAV Nervous System Requirements 
Unbalanced propellers in multi-rotor UAVs cause excess vibration and can lead to 
screws coming loose and potential crashes. The basic requirement for the first iteration of 
the UAV Nervous System is to detect excess vibrations and provide a response action. This 
must be accomplished in real-time via onboard measurements only and should utilize the 
Stateflow FDIR architecture developed in MATLAB/Simulink. Also, the detection should 
not be triggered unless an unbalanced propeller is confirmed. In other words, intermittent 
fault triggers are not desired; the fault status should not constantly flip back and forth 
between “fault” and “no fault” during flight. In addition, the UAV Nervous System should 
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be a standalone system that has minimal impact on the operation of the UAV. It should not 
add excessive mass or power drain to the UAV. 
3.3 FalconViz UAV Subsystem Taxonomy and Fault Tree 
The generic subsystem taxonomy has been adapted for the FalconViz UAV as shown 
in Figure 20. Most FalconViz UAV components are Commercial Off-the-Shelf, while the 
structure and overall design of the UAVs are produced in-house. A few of the fault-prone 
components are outside of the GN&C subsystem but directly affect it. For example, 
batteries and Electronic Speed Controls (ESCs) are components of the EPS that provide 
power to GN&C components such as propeller motors. The telemetry receiver, which 
connects the UAVs to hand controllers and ground stations, is a key TT&C component. 
Key GN&C components include the six motors and propellers, which are the sole attitude 
and translational control actuators on the vehicle. Note that the propellers of a multirotor 
UAV typically have fixed pitch; they perform both attitude and translational maneuvers by 
altering the speed of individual propeller rotations via the ESCs to change the direction of 
the resultant lift/thrust vector [42]. Some key translational sensors include a GPS receiver, 
a barometer, and accelerometers. Key attitude sensors are a rate gyroscope and a magnetic 
compass (magnetometer). Most GN&C software is embedded within the flight controller, 
including a set of translational guidance waypoints that can be uploaded by mission 
planning software on a ground station laptop. The GPS satellite constellation is also used 
by the GPS receiver to calculate the UAV’s position and velocity. 
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Figure 20 – Subsystem Taxonomy for UAV Nervous System 
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A fault tree for the FalconViz UAVs is shown in Figure 21. This is an expansion of 
the Internal Vehicle Flight Hardware branch of the generic fault tree from Section 2.3.2 
and shows basic event faults identified by the FalconViz engineering team. The top-level 
failure for this analysis is “Loss of control” which can be traced back to each the identified 
faults.  The three most important faults identified were “Motor not spinning,” “Motor or 
ESC overheats” and “Excessive vibration.”
 55 
  
Figure 21 – Fault Tree for FalconViz UAVs
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3.4 Fault Detection and Recovery Strategy 
Vibration detection is accomplished by evaluating accelerometer data measured from 
the arms of the UAV that house the propellers. A machine learning algorithm determines 
the health of the system from the data. If the propellers are unbalanced, then there will be 
much more vibration in the system. Once it is trained and validated on the ground, the 
machine learning model then identifies the health of the system from live data onboard the 
UAV. These outputs are sent into the state-based FDIR architecture in Stateflow. 
A SparkFun Triple Axis Accelerometer and Gyro Breakout – MPU-6050 [43], shown 
in Figure 22a, is installed on one arm of the hexacopter. Data is collected via a 
microcontroller programmed with Arduino protocols called the Teensy 3.2 [44], shown in 
Figure 22b. The Teensy is then connected to a MeegoPad T02 compute stick [45], shown 
in Figure 22c, via USB. 
 
Figure 22 – (a) SparkFun Triple Axis Accelerometer & Gyro Breakout – MPU-6050 





a.) b.) c.) 
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Figure 23 – Shrink-wrapped accelerometer installed on hexacopter arm,  
with sensor coordinate axes indicated [41] 
The shrink-wrapped MPU-6050 breakout board is mounted just below the propeller 
motor, as shown in Figure 23. The Teensy is installed on a SparkFun Teensy Arduino 
Shield Adapter [46] and connected to the MPU-6050 and other components via jumper 
cables and custom harnesses, as shown in Figure 24.  
 
Figure 24 – Teensy installed on Arduino Shield Adapter [46] 
with USB and jumper cable connections [41] 
If the propellers are unbalanced, there will be much more vibration in the system. A 
Simulink model run in Windows on the MeegoPad records data from the accelerometer 
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and feeds it through a supervised machine-learning classification algorithm in MATLAB 
called K-nearest neighbors (KNN) [47]. The KNN algorithm determines the health of the 
system from the data. Once it is trained and validated on the ground, the KNN model then 
identifies the health of the system from live data onboard the UAV. These outputs are sent 
into the state-based FDIR architecture in Stateflow. For tests, the propeller is unbalanced 
by adding a few pieces of electrical tape on one side, as shown in Figure 25. 
 
Figure 25 – Hexacopter propeller unbalanced by adding electrical tape [41] 
Flight test data is captured for both an unbalanced propeller (with tape) and a 
balanced propeller (without tape) and is used to train the KNN classification model in 
MATLAB on the ground. Training data plotted in Figure 26 shows that the unbalanced 
propeller has a higher vibration magnitude in y and z and that the y data shifts into the 
negative region. However, this information is not provided to the KNN algorithm.  
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Figure 26 – Training data for KNN classification model [41] 
Raw data from the two flights is combined and manually labelled by the user. 
Combined raw data for each axis (x,y,z) and assigned labels are fed into the KNN training 
algorithm in MATLAB. After training, the static KNN model is stored for use in flight and 
is not adapted further. The detection accuracy of the static model is verified with 
independent flight test validation data captured in the same way as the training data. The 
KNN classification detection algorithm then uses the trained KNN model to select the 
labels for each data point. The validation results, shown in Figure 27, exhibit a detection 
accuracy of 86.8%. 
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Figure 27 – Detected activity levels from KNN model validation data [41]28 
Once model training and validation is complete, the system is ready for in-flight 
detection. Data collected from the accelerometer in real-time is fed into the Simulink model 
shown in Figure 28 via a serial connection over USB. The Teensy and serial connections 
run at 115,200 baud (bits per second). The data is converted from ASCII characters to 
Figure 28 – Simulink diagram for UAV nervous system [41]27 
(see Figure 29) 
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numerical values by a custom MATLAB function and is saved to memory. It is then fed 
into the MATLAB KNN fault detection algorithm, which uses the trained static model to 
determine if the propeller is balanced or not. The detection is run on 100 samples at a time, 
and if 50 or more of these samples are classified as “unbalanced” by KNN, then the 
vibration FaultDetected flag is set to 1; otherwise the flag is set to 0, indicating the 
propeller is “balanced”. This FaultDetected flag is fed into the Stateflow diagram 
shown in Figure 29, which conducts state machine fault protection. Note that this diagram 
was developed before the generic architecture discussed in the previous chapter. It is 
adapted to fit the generic architecture in the Section 3.7. 
The Stateflow diagram begins with an initial state of “Normal” at the bottom right 
and an initial substate of “Standby”. If FaultDetected is set to 1, the substate within 
Figure 29 – Stateflow diagram for vibration fault detection [41] 
 62 
“Normal” transitions to “PotentialFault.” If the condition “FaultDetected=1” persists 
for a length of time specified by FaultPersistence, then the state transitions from 
“Normal” to “Fault”. However, if FaultDetected does not remain at 1 for long enough, 
then the state will remain “Normal” and the substate will return to “Standby”. Very similar 
logic applies for transitioning from “Fault” back to “Normal”: the condition 
FaultDetected=0 must persist for a length of time specified by 
ResolutionPersistence. The FaultStatus flag is the output signal matching 
the current state of the Stateflow chart, with 0 indicating “Normal” and 1 indicating 
“Fault”. The fault response involves sending the FaultStatus signal to the telemetry 
receiver. Simulink sends the FaultStatus signal back to the Teensy and then on to the 
FrSky X8R telemetry receiver [48] shown in Figure 30a. The pilot can view the value of 
FaultStatus on their Taranis X9D handheld radio controller [49], shown in Figure 30b, 
to indicate whether the propeller is balanced or not (0 or 1). If the variable is set to 1, the 
controller is programmed to begin beeping. When the variable is set to 0, the controller 
stops beeping. 
 
Figure 30 – a.) FrSky X8R telemetry receiver [48] installed on the hexacopter;  




3.5 Flight Test Results 
The UAV Nervous System has been flight-tested and successfully indicates the 
state of vibrations during flight. Figure 31 shows data recorded during the V&V test flight. 
The top three plots show accelerometer data and the bottom plot shows the FaultStatus 
signal output by the Stateflow diagram. The flight begins with the copter on the ground in 
segment A, and tape is placed on the propeller to unbalance it. The copter takes off and 
flies with an unbalanced propeller in segment B. The nervous system quickly detects the 
imbalance and outputs a FaultStatus of 1 at around 12 sec, shortly after segment B 
begins. During segment C, the copter lands, and the tape is removed to restore the propeller 
balance. Segment D shows balanced flight, and around 25 sec the nervous system detects 
that balance has been restored and sets FaultStatus to 0. The copter lands again in 
segment E and tape is added again. During segment E near 35 sec, a FaultStatus of 1 
occurs, and since there is no persistent “normal flight” data entering the system, 
FaultStatus does not return to 0. Unbalanced flight resumes during segment F, and 
FaultStatus remains at 1.  The tape is not well adhered to the propeller during this 
segment, and it comes loose and flies off at 40 sec. The copter transitions to balanced flight 
in segment G, which the nervous system detects around 45 sec, returning FaultStatus 
to 0. The delays in FaultStatus transitions are expected, as the system is tuned to avoid 
constant flipping between 0 and 1. 
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3.6 UAV Nervous System Upgrades 
 The flight test described above provided a proof-of-concept for the UAV Nervous 
System. In addition to the vibration sensor, a One Wire Digital Temperature Sensor 
DS18B20 [50] is used to monitor heating of the motors. It is important to detect when 
motors overheat because their shutdown and can lead to loss of the vehicle. Figure 32a 
shows the DS18B20 sensor and Figure 32b shows it installed on a motor with thermally 
conductive epoxy. The temperature reading in deg C is collected by the Teensy then 
downlinked to the Taranis radio via the telemetry receiver. This value is displayed on the 
radio for the pilot, and the radio is programmed to give a verbal warning (“too high”) when 
the temperature exceeds a predetermined threshold. This threshold is set by the pilot on the 
radio itself. An example plot of saved temperature values from the DS18B20 is shown in 
Figure 33. 
  
Figure 32 – a.) One Wire Digital Temperature Sensor DS18B20 [50]                              





Figure 33 – Example plot of DS18B20 temperature data [41] 
Next, the 90 A AttoPilot Voltage and Current Sense Breakout Board [51], shown 
in Figure 34b is added by splicing the power wires between the lithium polymer battery 
[52], shown in Figure 34c, and the ESC shown in Figure 34a. Telemetry for ESC voltage 
and current are fed into the Teensy and routed to Simulink for fault protection.  
  
Figure 34 – a.) Electronic Speed Control (ESC) [41] b.) 90 A AttoPilot Voltage and 
Current Sense Breakout Board [51], c.) lithium polymer battery [52] 
Once all of these sensors were added successfully, completing the sensor suite for 
a single arm of the copter, a second identical sensor suite was also installed on an adjacent 
arm of the copter as shown in Figure 35. The Teensy on one arm is designated as a central 
b.) a.) c.) 
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Teensy and is connected to the Simulink FP system on the Meego. A complete connection 
diagram is shown in Appendix B. The Inter-Integrated Circuit (I2C) protocol is used for 
streaming data from each arm to the central Teensy. Although only two arms are initially 
instrumented, the FalconViz team can duplicate the sensor suite for each arm and deploy 
the system on their copters for future flights. 
 
Figure 35 – Duplicate sensor suites installed on two adjacent UAV arms 
The Simulink model for two arms, shown in Figure 36, is constructed by using a 
state machine for each sensor reading on each arm, resulting in a bank of eight state 
machines total, two each for acceleration, temperature, current, and voltage. All of these 
sensor readings are fed to the central Teensy via I2C and then to the Meego via a USB 
Serial connection. Each ASCII value for the sensor readings is decoded into numeric values 
in MATLAB. Then, the accelerometer values are fed into the KNN algorithm and the 
temperature, current, and voltage values are compared against minimum and maximum 
values, based on the limits defined in Table 3.       
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 Figure 36 – Simulink model for UAV Nervous System on two arms with four sensor readings each
Data Input from 
Teensy via Serial 
Fault Detection 
Function 
Bank of FP 
State Machines 
Data Output to 
Teensy via Serial 
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n/a n/a 0.025 sec 0.03 sec 
Temperature 
(deg C) 
n/a 60 deg C 1.5 sec 1.5 sec 
Voltage (V) 21.6 V 
(6 cell*3.6 V) 
25.2 V 
(6 cell*4.2 V) 
1.5 sec 1.5 sec 
Current (A) 1 A 25 A 2 sec 1.5 sec 
Although the state machine in Figure 29 is used in the UAV Nervous System, it 
should be noted that for temperature, voltage, and current sensing a simple rule-based 
paradigm (with persistence) is implemented through state machines for fault detection. The 
acceleration detection method is a bit more complex because machine learning is used to 
determine if a fault has occurred or not, but ultimately the fault detection threshold is based 
on persistence for the outputs of the machine learning algorithm. 
A series of additional test flights was completed to ensure that the upgraded UAV 
Nervous System was working properly. These test flights were completed with one arm 
first and then with both arms. Each of the thresholds for temperature, current, and voltage 
were tested by adjusting them slightly above and below the nominal values for each sensor. 
The acceleration detection was also tested, repeating the test shown in Figure 31. Because 
the helicopter had been in a crash since the previous flight test, it was necessary to 
rebalance the propellers as shown in Figure 37. 
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Figure 37 – Rebalancing UAV propellers using an iPhone accelerometer 
3.7 Adaptation of Generic FDIR Architecture to UAV Nervous System 
After the generic FDIR architecture described in Chapter 2 was created, the UAV 
Nervous System case study was revisited and adjusted to match the generic architecture.  
First, the generic functional state machine was adapted for the FalconViz UAV test flight, 
as shown in Figure 38. Many of the states from the generic diagram were unnecessary 
because of the relative simplicity of the UAV test flight. The Standby state in the bottom 
left is the starting state and represents the copter sitting stationary on the lab bench at the 
beginning of the test flight when the UAV Nervous System is activated and data recording 
begins. When the copter is being carried outside (CarryingCopter=1), the Transfer 
state begins. The Transfer state ends when the copter is set down on the ground outside 
(ArriveAtStandoff=1), which begins the Piloted phase. During Standoff, the first 
substate of the Piloted phase, the copter is sitting on the ground, waiting for the pilot’s 
command to proceed. When the pilot begins throttling up the motors to launch the copter 
 71 
(Liftoff=1), the NominalZone substate begins, indicating that the copter is flying. 
When the copter lands and the motors are powered down (Landed=1), the active state 
returns to Standoff. Note that no additional abort states are included in this functional state 
machine because the standard abort procedure when a fault is detected is for the pilot to 
land the copter. 
 
Figure 38 – Functional state machine for FalconViz UAV test flight 
Next, the generic diagnostic state machine was adapted for the UAV Nervous System 
as shown in Figure 39. In this case, the trigger for fault detection (FaultDetected=1) 
is set to the output of the machine learning algorithm for vibration detection. This is done 
without regard to persistence, so whenever the machine learning algorithm indicates a fault 
detection, the FaultDetected state and Diagnose substate become active. Because only one 
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fault could be caused by this particular detection, only one fault diagnosis substate is 
present in the diagnostic state machine. The “Propeller Unbalanced” fault is diagnosed if 
the fault detection trigger remains active for the “Time To Detect” of 0.025 sec from Table 
3, and if the current state of the functional state machine is NominalZone (indicating the 
copter is flying). This check is evaluated by the fault diagnosis routine. The routine then 
sets the FaultConfirmed1 variable to 1, causing the diagnostic state machine to enter 
the RespondA1 substate. The CorrectiveAction1 variable is then set to 1, causing a 
signal to be sent to the pilot to land the copter as described in previous sections. If the fault 
detection is only intermittent, then fault diagnosis will be inconclusive. In either case, when 
the fault detection flag from the machine learning algorithm is set to zero for the “Time to 
Resolve” length of 0.03 sec the state machine will return its active state to 
NoFaultDetected. 
 
Figure 39 – Diagnostic state machine for UAV Nervous System 
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 To demonstrate the modified FDIR architecture, recorded flight test data was 
loaded from a data file and replayed in Simulink using the model shown in Figure 40. The 
fault detection algorithm was kept unmodified from Figure 36 for one arm of the copter. 
The functional and diagnostic state machines described above were added, and MATLAB 
functions were written to calculate mode management inputs to the functional state 
machine and fault diagnostic inputs to the diagnostic state machine. The bank of FP state 
machines were kept but were used only to compare their output to the output of the new 
architecture. An adapted flow chart showing the interactions of the various components of 
the FDIR architecture for the UAV Nervous System is shown in Figure 41.  
 The recorded flight test data and FDIR architecture output are shown in Figure 42. 
Note that this flight test data is similar but not exactly the same as the flight test data shown 
in Figure 31; the flights were performed on different dates and at different stages of 
development of the UAV Nervous System. The top three plots in Figure 41 show 
accelerometer data and the bottom plot shows the FaultConfirmed1 signal output by 
the diagnostic function in the FDIR Architecture. The data begins with the copter on the 
lab bench in segment A and tape is placed on the propeller to unbalance it. The copter is 
carried outside from the lab during segment B. The copter takes off and flies with an 
unbalanced propeller in segment C. The FDIR architecture quickly detects the imbalance 
and outputs a FaultConfirmed status of 1 at around 3 sec, shortly after segment C 
begins. At the end of segment C the copter lands, and the FDIR architecture immediately 
resets the fault confirmed status to 0. During segment D the copter is on the ground, and 
the tape is removed to restore the propeller balance. Segment E shows balanced flight, and 
the copter lands again at the end of segment E. During segment F, tape is added again while 
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Figure 40 – Simulink diagram for modified UAV Nervous System FDIR Architecture 
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Figure 42 – Results of test flight replay with UAV Nervous System FDIR Architecture 
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the copter is on the ground. Unbalanced flight resumes during segment G, and between 11 
and 12 sec the FDIR architecture quickly detects the imbalance and outputs a 
FaultConfirmed status of 1. The copter lands at the end of segment G, and the FDIR 
architecture immediately resets the FaultConfirmed status to 0. Note that inaccuracies 
in the fault status of Figure 42 are much less than in the flight test shown in Figure 31 using 
the previous iteration of the UAV Nervous System. Although the new system is operating 
on similar flight data to the previous system, the improved performance is attributable to 
the addition of a state machine monitoring the state of the UAV. By monitoring the ESC 
current, the updated architecture is able to determine whether the UAV is flying or not and 
takes this into account when diagnosing whether a fault is present. For example, in segment 
D of Figure 31 the previous system took several seconds to correctly report balanced flight, 
but segments D and E of Figure 42 do not exhibit the same issue. 
The UAV Nervous System FDIR Architecture has been developed and tested for a 
terrestrial rotary wing UAV. The Nervous System utilizes a suite of sensors for two arms, 
each containing an accelerometer, a temperature sensor, and a voltage/current sensor. The 
system proof-of-concept has been shown by V&V through flight testing. The generic FDIR 
architecture has been successfully adapted for use with the UAV Nervous System and has 
been demonstrated in MATLAB/Simulink using recorded flight test data. Additional 




CHAPTER 4. SPACE APPLICATION: MARS SAMPLE RETURN 
RENDEZVOUS AND ORBITING SAMPLE CAPTURE 
A second use of the state machine FDIR architecture has been developed for an 
automated relative ProxOps application. This work supports development of a Mars 
Sample Return (MSR) mission. The process for development of requirements of the MSR 
fault protection behavior was published at the 68th International Astronautical Congress in 
Adelaide, Australia [53] and the Symposium on Space Innovations in Atlanta, GA [54]. 
4.1 Overview of Relative Proximity Operations 
 Relative ProxOps have been performed in Earth orbit and cis-lunar space since the 
early years of the space age. There is an increased need for autonomous relative ProxOps 
in such applications as rendezvous and docking for human space exploration and sample 
return missions, satellite servicing and on-orbit inspection, construction, and debris 
mitigation. Deep space proximity operations applications require advanced autonomy and 
fault protection due to the significant round-trip light time from Earth. Many autonomous 
ProxOps systems have been developed and proven in flight for large and complex systems 
[55-57] and are increasingly being used with small satellites [58,59], including the Prox-1 
mission being developed at Georgia Tech [15,31]. One researcher has conducted a detailed 
survey of the history of relative ProxOps and describes many other recent missions [60]. 
Development of spacecraft GN&C software architectures often involves bringing together 
individually developed algorithms and evaluating them using simulation and Software-in-
the-Loop (SITL) or Processor-in-the-Loop (PITL) testing [61]. The process of spacecraft 
GN&C algorithm development and integration using model-based design in Simulink and 
later autocoding into FSW has been exercised by the Orion spacecraft team at NASA’s 
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Johnson Space Center [18]. Other missions have used selective autocoding of GN&C 
algorithms into FSW [62-64]. 
4.2 Overview of Mars Sample Return Mission Concept 
The top priority stated in the current planetary science decadal survey is to perform 
a MSR mission [65]. NASA, JPL, and the European Space Agency are in the process of 
formulating a series of missions that will culminate in the return of scientifically selected 
Mars samples to Earth [66]. In one mission concept, a Mars orbiter would rendezvous with 
a sample canister launched from the surface and capture it for return to Earth [67]. The last 
stage of this rendezvous operation, including capture, must be autonomous. During this 
autonomous phase, fault protection should be used to ensure mission success [68].  
In the current MSR mission concept, the Mars 2020 rover will collect soil and rock 
samples and cache them on the Martian surface. They will then be collected by a 
subsequent “fetch” rover (or other vehicle) and inserted into an Orbiting Sample container 
(OS). The OS will be placed on a Mars Ascent Vehicle (MAV) and launched into Mars 
orbit, as shown in Figure 43a. Once the MAV reaches orbit, it will release the OS into a 
passive near-circular orbit. The Sample Return Orbiter (SRO) will perform ground-in-the-
loop rendezvous with the OS, as shown in Figure 43b, followed by autonomous approach 
and capture operations (also known as “terminal rendezvous and capture”) to collect the 
OS, as shown in Figure 43c [67]. The final approach will encompass approximately the 
last 100 meters of rendezvous and must be autonomous due to communication time delays 
for signals to travel over the large distance between Earth and Mars (between 4 and 24 
minutes) [69]. Finally, the samples would be returned to Earth or cis-lunar space for 
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recovery and laboratory study. The GN&C process for the terminal rendezvous and capture 
phase is complex, with a number of risk areas that could result in failure to capture the OS.  
This mission-critical autonomous activity presents the need for a comprehensive FP 
approach to ensure that operations proceed under nominal conditions, take action to address 
certain fault conditions, or abort the capture phase. 
 
Figure 43 – Mars Sample Return rendezvous concept [53] 
4.3 Reference Frame and Relative Orbital Element Definitions 
This study makes use of several inertial and rotating reference frames, as well as 
dynamical parameters called relative orbital elements that are useful for visualizing the 
relative orbit geometry. Background information on coordinate systems and relative orbital 
elements is presented in this section. 
Three primary reference frames are utilized in this chapter for describing orbit and 




frame is an inertial frame centered at Mars analogous to the Earth-Centered Inertial 
reference frame. This frame is defined by NASA’s Navigation and Ancillary Information 
Facility at JPL for the Spacecraft, Planet, Instrument, Orientation, & Events (SPICE) 
ephemeris toolkit [70]: 
Mars Mean Equator and IAU vector of J2000. The IAU-vector at Mars is the point                      
on the mean equator of Mars where the equator ascends through the earth mean 
equator. This vector is the cross product of Earth mean north with Mars mean north.  
The Local Vertical Local Horizontal (LVLH) reference frame is used to describe 
relative orbit dynamics. The LVLH frame is an orbit-defined frame whose origin typically 
lies at the center of mass of the target satellite with the three axes defined by the position 
vector (radial), velocity vector (along-track) and their cross product (cross-track). Figure 
44 shows an illustration of this coordinate frame. Note that the LVLH frame is constantly 
translating and rotating as the OS moves in its orbit about Mars. 
For the MSR mission, it is assumed that no a priori knowledge of the OS inertial 
position and velocity is known. Thus, the origin of the LVLH frame is located at the OS’s 
estimated position relative to the SRO, but the orientation of the LVLH frame is based on 
the SRO’s inertial position. As a result, the orientation of the basis vectors �𝑹𝑹� ,𝑺𝑺�,𝑾𝑾��  are 
defined by Eq. (1), where 𝒓𝒓𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 and 𝒗𝒗𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 are the positon and velocity vectors of the SRO in 
the Mars IAU frame and the x superscript represents the skew function. When the skew  
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Figure 44 – Visual representation of the LVLH frame [15] 
function is applied to a vector, a skew symmetric matrix is created which, when multiplied 
with another vector, produces the same result as a cross product between the two vectors. 
The following assumptions are applied in calculation of the LVLH frame unit vectors: the 
distance between the SRO and OS is small compared with the OS orbit radius, and the 
inertial orbital velocity of the OS is approximately equal to the orbital velocity of the SRO. 




    𝑺𝑺� ∶= 𝑾𝑾
�𝑥𝑥𝑹𝑹�
��𝑾𝑾�𝑥𝑥𝑹𝑹���
    (1) 
 The Body-Fixed Frame is a coordinate frame that is fixed with respect to the SRO. 
It is centered at the SRO center of mass with the three basis vectors {𝑥𝑥�𝑏𝑏 ,𝑦𝑦�𝑏𝑏 , ?̂?𝑧𝑏𝑏} defined such 
that 𝑦𝑦�𝑏𝑏 is oriented along the imager boresight, ?̂?𝑧𝑏𝑏 is normal to the bottom plate and oriented 
away from the body of the satellite, and 𝑥𝑥�𝑏𝑏 is defined by the right hand rule.  The main 
purpose of this coordinate frame is to determine the attitude and angular velocity of the 
SRO relative to the Mars IAU Frame. Since the SRO does not yet have a defined shape, 
Figure 45 shows the orientation of the body-fixed frame with respect to the Prox-1 
spacecraft as an example. 
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Figure 45 – Prox-1 Body-Fixed Frame orientation [15] 
 Relative orbital elements (ROEs) describe the relative motion of one object with 
respect to another in orbit, in an analogous way to the conventional orbital elements used 
to describe a two-body orbit [60]. ROEs were developed based on the Clohessy-Wiltshire 
model and rely on the corresponding assumptions of a circular target spacecraft orbit and 
small relative distance to the target. The ROEs described in Cartesian LVLH coordinates, 
where the x-axis is represented by 𝑹𝑹� , the y-axis is represented by 𝑺𝑺�, and the z-axis is 
represented by 𝑾𝑾�, are derived in detail in [71] and are given by Eqs. 2-7, where n is the 
mean motion of the target spacecraft, 𝑡𝑡0 is a reference time, 𝑡𝑡 is the evaluation time, 
𝑥𝑥0, 𝑦𝑦0, 𝑧𝑧0 are the initial LVLH position states at 𝑡𝑡0, and ?̇?𝑥0, ?̇?𝑦0, ?̇?𝑧0 are the initial velocity 
states at 𝑡𝑡0. 




𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟 = 𝑦𝑦0 −
2?̇?𝑥0
𝑛𝑛
− (6𝑛𝑛𝑥𝑥0 + 3?̇?𝑦0)(𝑡𝑡 − 𝑡𝑡0) (3) 
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𝜓𝜓 = 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛2 �𝑧𝑧0,
?̇?𝑧0
𝑛𝑛
� + 𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡 − 𝑡𝑡0) (7) 
 The orbit of the chaser spacecraft about the target is a two-by-one ellipse about the 
instantaneous center of motion (𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟 ,𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟) with a semi-major axis of 𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟, a semi-minor axis of 
1
2
𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟, and a cross-track amplitude of 𝐴𝐴𝑧𝑧. 𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟 is the relative eccentric anomaly of the ellipse, 
and 𝜓𝜓 is the cross-track phase angle. Figure 46 shows this relative orbit geometry, and Eqs. 
8-13 describe the LVLH Cartesian position and velocity state in terms of ROEs. 





𝑦𝑦 = 𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟 + 𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟 sin(𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟) (9) 






?̇?𝑦 =  −
3
2
𝑛𝑛𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟 + 𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟 cos(𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟) 
(12) 
?̇?𝑧 = 𝑛𝑛𝐴𝐴𝑧𝑧 cos(𝜓𝜓) (13) 
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Figure 46 – Relative orbit geometry 
4.4 Rendezvous & Capture Concept of Operations 
In collaboration with the MSR rendezvous team at JPL, a detailed process has been 
defined for the overall MSR rendezvous and capture concept of operations. This section 
presents the detailed process, with particular attention to autonomous terminal rendezvous. 
A description of rendezvous maneuvers using ROEs and example trajectories are also 
presented. An overview of the full process is shown in Figure 47.  
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Figure 47 – Overall rendezvous and capture process 
4.4.1 Initial Rendezvous Process 
Phase 0 of the rendezvous process involves launching the MAV from the surface 
of Mars and releasing the OS into orbit around Mars. Phase 1 is initial acquisition and orbit 
matching, in which the SRO first acquires images of the OS from thousands of kilometers 
away. Relative orbit determination is performed by engineers on the ground, and once a 
reliable relative orbit estimate is obtained maneuvers are performed to begin matching the 
SRO orbit to within about 10 km of the OS. During Phase 2, the OS is continually inspected 
by the SRO to obtain a refined relative orbit estimate with ground-in-the-loop navigation 
solutions. Approach maneuvers or “hops” are also performed during Phase 2 to gradually 
move the SRO closer to the OS. This study begins in Phase 2C, after the SRO is placed in 
a passively safe “standby” orbit within 100 m of the OS. This orbit is an inclined “safety 
ellipse” in either a leading or trailing orbit relative to the OS. As shown in Figure 48, the 
relative orbit has an out-of-plane cross-track component. If there is any altitude difference 
between the SRO’s relative center of motion and the OS, the relative orbit of the SRO may 
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drift along-track toward or away from the OS. There is no risk of collision if drift occurs 
because the SRO’s relative orbit is not in-plane with the OS. 
 
Figure 48 – Illustration of passively safe standby trajectory (not to scale)  
a.) Radial view (looking towards Mars) b.) Along-track view (along OS velocity vector) 
 
4.4.2 Autonomous Terminal Rendezvous & Capture Process 
 The terminal rendezvous and capture process in Phase 3 was developed into a 
functional state machine, shown in Figure 49. This state machine is based on the generic 
functional state machine and is used by the fault protection system to determine how to 
respond to various faults as they are detected. This section walks through each step of this 
process and explains how the state machine operates. Two types of approach strategies are 
currently under consideration for the terminal rendezvous phase. The first is a forced 
motion approach, which involves approaching the target using autonomous closed-loop 
control either via the along-track direction (v-bar) [56], radial direction (r-bar) [55], or 
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Figure 49 – State machine for rendezvous and capture process 
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some hybrid between the two directions. The second strategy is a ballistic approach, which 
involves performing a single maneuver to place the spacecraft on a ballistic collision 
course. The ballistic approach is computationally simpler but has fewer safety 
considerations. This study assumes a forced motion v-bar approach, but differences 
between the forced motion and ballistic approach will be mentioned in the description of 
the rendezvous process. 
Fault responses are calibrated based on the relative risk to the mission in each sub-
phase. The state machine in Figure 49 represents both nominal and off-nominal processes. 
The flow of the nominal process begins in the bottom left corner and continues upwards 
around the border of the chart to the bottom right. Off-nominal processes are shown in the 
middle of the chart.  
4.4.2.1 Phase 2C: Passive Standby 
 The SRO begins in a passively safe standby orbit at the end of the ground-in-the-
loop rendezvous process, as described in Section 4.4.1; this is the state in the bottom left 
of Figure 49. The SRO can remain in Phase 2C for an extended period of time if necessary. 
A ground command must be provided (GroundCommand=1) to initiate the autonomous 
sequence (Phase 3). Even when a ground command is provided, the autonomous sequence 
will not initiate if a fault has been detected (FaultDetectedMode=1). 
4.4.2.2 Phase 3A: Final Hop 
If a forced motion approach strategy is chosen, the autonomous sequence would 
include a Final Planar Hop from the out-of-plane passively safe trajectory to the plane of 
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the terminal approach corridor, removing the cross-track motion provided by the safety 
ellipse while also moving closer to the target in the along-track direction. The planar hop 
ends when the SRO arrives at a standoff position (ArriveAtStandoff=1) just before 
the start of the final approach. Note that the Final Hop phase is not necessary if a ballistic 
approach strategy is chosen. 
4.4.2.3 Phase 3B-1: Standoff 
 The closed-loop approach sequence (Phase 3B) is shown in Figure 50. This phase 
begins with the SRO holding position in a standoff tens of meters away from the OS on the 
along-track axis. When proper lighting (SunlitOS=1) and communication conditions 
(Earth not occulted by Mars, CommPossible=1) are achieved and the OS has been 
acquired by all rendezvous sensors that can see it at that range 
(OSInView_AllSensors=1), the Rendezvous OS Capture System (ROCS) capture 
mechanism is armed (ArmROCS=1) and the approach begins. Even if all of these 
conditions are met, the final approach will not initiate if a fault has been detected 
(FaultDetectedMode=1). Although real-time two-way communication is not possible 
during autonomous terminal approach and capture (Phase 3) because of communication 
time delays, the communication condition is imposed to allow the ground team to monitor 
autonomous operations by streaming telemetry and possibly live video to the ground. 
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Figure 50 – Closed-Loop Approach Sequence 
4.4.2.4 Phase 3B-3: Zone 1 – Passive Miss Region 
“Zones of Criticality” have been specified for the final approach after leaving the 
standoff position. The zones shown in Figure 51 are used to alter fault protection behavior 
based on distance to the target and time to intercept. Durations and distances listed are 
dependent on the rendezvous approach strategy and specific parameters selected, so the 
transition conditions between these zones may vary, but the criticality (and thus impact on 
FP behavior) of the zones will endure regardless of the implementation selected. Also note 
that Zone 1 (Passive Miss Region) does not exist if a ballistic terminal approach is selected. 
The closest approach distance and minimum velocity used to calculate the zone transitions 
are computed by propagating the ROEs after each maneuver using Clohessey-Wiltshire 
assumptions and then converting to Cartesian coordinates. 
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Figure 51 – Notional “zones of criticality” 
Zone 1 is called the “passive miss region”. During this zone the SRO must perform 
regular maneuvers to remain on an intercept course with the OS. If the SRO stops 
maneuvering (a passive abort), then it will pass by the OS harmlessly.  
4.4.2.5 Passive Abort 
If at any point in the Passive Miss Region something goes wrong, the system simply 
stops maneuvers (StopManuevers=1) and enters Passive Abort, allowing the SRO to 
drift away from the OS. Once the SRO has reached a safe distance from the OS 
(ArriveAtStandby=1), it returns to the out-of-plane Passive Standby trajectory and 
awaits ground commands before resuming autonomous operations. 
4.4.2.6 Phase 3B-4: Zone 2 – Active Abort Region 
If no problems occur during the Passive Miss Region, the system will enter the 
“Active Abort Region” when the minimum propagated range from the SRO to the OS 
becomes less than the defined capture distance from the SRO’s center of mass. During this 
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zone, if the SRO stops maneuvers it will intercept the OS, but if an active abort maneuver 
is performed intercept can be avoided. 
4.4.2.7 Active Abort 
If at any point during the Active Abort Region something goes wrong, an abort can 
be commanded (Abort=1) to return to Passive Standby via the Active Abort mode. The 
active abort maneuver immediately adds out-of-plane motion and moves away from the 
target to avoid an intercept. It then allows the SRO to drift slowly away from OS until it 
returns to the out-of-plane Passive Standby trajectory (ArriveAtStandby=1). 
4.4.2.8 Phase 3B-5: Zone 3 – Unavoidable Intercept Region 
Finally, just before intercept the system enters the third zone, which is called the 
“unavoidable intercept region”. The condition to enter Zone 3 is that the abort thrust 
required must be higher than the SRO’s propulsion system can generate, in addition to the 
minimum propagated range from the SRO to the OS being less than the defined capture 
distance from the SRO’s center of mass. During this zone, the SRO can no longer avoid 
intercepting the OS even if an abort maneuver is performed. It must either capture the OS, 
or it will likely collide. Note that Zone 3 may be very short (on the order of seconds) if the 
SRO has a robust thrust capability. 
4.4.2.9 LocateOS 
If capture is unsuccessful and the OS does not enter the capture volume 
(OSEnterCaptureVolume=1) within the specified WaitTime, the system enters the 
“LocateOS” state. It will attempt to determine where the OS is located 
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(OSLocatedOutside=1) before performing any slew or thrust maneuvers. Once the 
OS is found (OSConfirmed=1), an abort maneuver is commanded (Abort=1).  
4.4.2.10 Phase 3C: Capture 
 If the OS enters the capture volume successfully, the capture process (Phase 3C) 
begins. This process is shown in Figure 52. The OS passes by a sensor such as a laser 
curtain, which indicates that it is entering the capture volume. Once the OS has cleared the 
laser curtain and is fully inside the capture volume, a command is sent to close to capture 
door (CloseDoor=1). A confirmation sensor then verifies that the OS is inside 
(OSConfirmed=1). If the OS cannot be confirmed inside the capture volume within the 
specified WaitTime after the door has closed, the system enters the LocateOS state and 
commands an abort (Abort=1). 
 
Figure 52 – OS Capture Process 
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4.4.3 Description of Terminal Rendezvous Maneuvers 
 While there are many different approach schemes that can be used for terminal 
rendezvous, a v-bar approach has been selected to create scenarios to test the FP system. 
This approach begins with the SRO ahead of the OS in the same orbit. The semi-major axis 
of the SRO’s orbit is then slightly reduced so that the two spacecraft will drift apart further 
if a maneuver cannot be performed. Reducing the semi-major axis results in an eccentricity 
change, creating the appearance of “hops” in the LVLH plane. The SRO then executes a 
maneuver in the radial direction to begin another hop every time it crosses the orbit of the 
OS. ROEs are used to visualize and design the approach and to provide an initial estimate 
of the velocity change (ΔV) required for each maneuver. 
 The ΔV required to cancel out the cross-track velocity is found with the following 
procedure. First, z is set to zero in Eq. 10, the cross track phase angle 𝜓𝜓 is obtained, and 
this value and the current Cartesian LVLH state are substituted into Eq. 7 to obtain the time 
of xy-plane crossing. The ΔV applied at this time is the negative (-) of Eq. 13. This 
maneuver marks the beginning of the Final Hop. At the end of the Final Hop, a “hold 
position” maneuver is performed to hold the relative position constant. In this maneuver, 
all relative velocity is cancelled out when the chaser crosses the LVLH x-axis. At any time, 
the relative drift of the spacecraft in the along-track direction can be stopped by setting 𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟 
to zero (giving both spacecraft the same semi-major axis) and solving Eq. 2 for ?̇?𝑦0. This is 
known as a “freeze drift” maneuver. 
 When defining the v-bar approach maneuvers, ROEs are helpful in describing the 
size of each hop. The ROE approach parameters 𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 and 𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 completely describe the 
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distance that will be traveled in each hop, the time each hop will take, and the rate at which 
the along-track center of motion of the SRO will move away from the OS in the event of a 
passive abort. The time required for each hop, Δ𝑡𝑡, is given in Eq. 14. This equation is 
obtained by setting Eq. 8 to zero and substituting the chosen values of 𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 and 𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎. 
The along-track distance traveled in each hop, Δ𝑦𝑦, is given in Eq. 16. This equation is 
obtained by substituting Eq. 14 into Eq. 15 then substituting the result into Eq. 9. Eq. 15 is 








𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟 = 𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟0 −
3
2
𝑛𝑛𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(t − t0) (15) 
Δ𝑦𝑦 =  −3𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 �𝜋𝜋 − acos�
2𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎






4.4.4 Example Mission Scenarios 
Plots of example trajectories are shown in this section to illustrate a nominal 
terminal rendezvous approach, a passive abort scenario, and an active abort scenario. These 
plots have been generated by MATLAB code assuming linear relative dynamics and 
impulsive ΔV maneuvers. For each scenario, an xy-projection of the trajectory, a three-
dimensional (3D) view, and time histories of the relative position and velocity are shown. 
Impulsive maneuvers are shown in the xy-projection and the 3D view as red vectors 
indicating location, ΔV direction, and ΔV magnitude. Note that ΔV magnitudes are scaled 
automatically in each plot by MATLAB’s quiver3 function for visibility, so they only have 
meaning relative to one another in the same plot and their exact magnitudes cannot be read 
directly from an individual plot or compared directly with other plots. Red diamonds 
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indicate the location of maneuvers in the time history plots. Impulsive maneuvers are 
represented as discontinuities in the velocity time history plot.  
The SRO initial orbit conditions for all scenarios are expressed in terms of ROEs. 
The conditions are given by setting 𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟 to 0 m, 𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟 to 50 m, 𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟 to 20 m, 𝐴𝐴𝑧𝑧 to 10 m, 𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟 to 
zero, and 𝜓𝜓 to zero. For the v-bar approach, 𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎ℎ is set to -0.5 m and 𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎ℎ is 
set to 4 m. These parameters result in a Δ𝑡𝑡 of 4,251 sec (70.85 min) and a Δ𝑦𝑦 of -10.48 m 
per hop, with the negative indicating a decreasing 𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟 with each hop. 
4.4.4.1 Nominal Approach Trajectory 
A nominal approach trajectory is shown in Figures 53-56 and involves the 
following phases. First, out-of-plane natural motion occurs in the passively safe standby 
trajectory before any control is activated; this is the blue portion of the trajectory in the 
plots. Once trajectory control is activated (at the start of the black portion of the trajectory), 
the controller allows the SRO to continue in natural motion until the xy-plane is reached. 
At this point, a planar hop maneuver is commanded to remove all out-of-plane motion and 
the red portion of the trajectory begins. The controller allows the SRO to continue coasting 
until the along-track axis is reached. At this point, a hold position maneuver is commanded 
to hold the SRO at a fixed relative position. A small maneuver is commanded to begin the 
v-bar approach (blue portion of the trajectory), and subsequent hops are performed until 
the SRO is near the OS. At this point, the green portion of the trajectory begins and the 
controller allows the SRO to coast until it reaches the point of closest approach (the red x) 
at a range of 1.08 m, where another hold position maneuver is performed to represent OS 
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capture. This final maneuver is for illustration purposes only and may not be necessary to 
capture the OS dynamically. Detailed capture dynamics are not simulated. 
Figure 53 – Relative orbit xy-projection (LVLH) for nominal trajectory 
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Figure 55 – Relative position time history (LVLH) for nominal trajectory 
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Figure 56 – Relative velocity time history (LVLH) for nominal trajectory 
 
4.4.4.2 Passive Abort Trajectory 
The passive abort trajectory is shown in Figures 57-60. This scenario is identical to 
the nominal approach until the passive abort occurs in the green portion of the trajectory. 
Assuming a fault has been detected, no additional maneuvers are performed, and the SRO 
passes through the point of closest approach at 1.15 m and does not perform a hold position 
maneuver. It simply continues in natural motion, which causes it to drift back away from 
the OS in the negative along-track direction until it reaches the standby distance of 50 m. 
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At this point, a safety ellipse maneuver is performed (magenta portion of the trajectory) to 
inject out-of-plane cross-track motion. Finally, a freeze drift maneuver is performed in the 
yellow portion of the trajectory to eliminate along-track drift of the out-of-plane passively 
safe standby ellipse. 
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Figure 58 – Relative orbit three dimensional view (LVLH) for passive abort 
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Figure 59 – Relative position time history (LVLH) for passive abort 
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4.4.4.3 Active Abort Trajectory 
The active abort trajectory is shown in Figures 61-65. Figure 63 shows an additional 
3D view to more clearly illustrate the active abort. This scenario is identical to the nominal 
approach until the active abort occurs in the green portion of the trajectory. Assuming a 
fault has been detected, a maneuver is performed to inject out-of-plane cross-track motion. 
This location becomes the point of closest approach at a range of 6.92 m. During the 
Figure 60 – Relative velocity time history (LVLH) for passive abort 
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magenta portion of the trajectory, natural motion causes the out-of-plane ellipse to drift 
back away from the target in the negative along-track direction until it reaches the standby 
distance of 50 m from the OS. Finally, a freeze drift maneuver is performed in the yellow 
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Figure 63 – Relative orbit three dimensional view (LVLH) for active abort 
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Figure 64 – Relative position time history (LVLH) for active abort 
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Figure 65 – Relative velocity time history (LVLH) for active abort 
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4.5 MSR Fault Protection Requirements Development 
A desired set of fault protection behaviors is established in this section for the 
autonomous rendezvous and capture phase of the SRO mission. A fault tree analysis is 
performed to determine which faults should be considered based on input from subject 
matter experts. Several major areas are considered, including relative orbit determination, 
guidance & control, sequencing, and capture operations. Next, a selected subset of faults 
in each of these areas is expanded in detail. Criticality, detection, diagnosis, and response 
strategies are examined at various stages of the rendezvous and capture process. These 
details are used to define a set of potential fault protection requirements that accounts for 
different conditions in different stages of the process. In the following section, a fault 
protection architecture is developed that shows how fault protection could be implemented 
during this unique and challenging mission phase.  
The terminal rendezvous and OS capture scenario provides an excellent case study 
for fault protection research. The initial portion of this study develops a desired set of FP 
behaviors for autonomous rendezvous and capture of the OS. This has been done in 
collaboration with the Mars Sample Return (MSR) mission formulation team at JPL. The 
MSR rendezvous working group is made up of members from three disciplines: relative 
orbit determination, guidance & control, and sequencing. A separate ROCS team is 
developing concepts for the flight hardware subsystem that will perform the capture 
operation. Inputs have also been sought from the SRO flight systems working group about 
various aspects of spacecraft subsystem concepts. 
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There are three desired outcomes for the MSR team. First, a set of initial FP 
requirements should be defined. These requirements may then be used to drive the initial 
design of the SRO rendezvous and capture system. Next, the MSR team desires to integrate 
fault protection with mission concept development, influencing design decisions during 
Pre-Phase A based on FP considerations. Finally, the MSR team desires to apply the FP 
process used in this study to other aspects of MSR mission design. 
Several key requirements guided this study. First, mission success is vital. Fault 
protection should be designed to ensure the SRO mission to capture the OS can be 
completed or aborted without ground intervention, even under fault conditions. As stated 
earlier, autonomy is a key feature, since terminal rendezvous and capture occur fully 
autonomously. Safety is also a key concern, and fault protection should prevent the 
spacecraft from colliding with the OS. Finally, time criticality should be taken into account. 
For example, a fault response may be quite different at the beginning of the autonomous 
rendezvous sequence when the SRO is 100 m from the OS than in the last 5 or 10 meters. 
Several different tasks were undertaken in order to define the fault protection behavior 
for autonomous rendezvous and capture. Some of these are standard fault protection 
practices, and others were customized for this study. All tasks have been completed at the 
preliminary level only, since detailed design has not yet begun for this mission concept. 
4.5.1 MSR GN&C Subsystem Taxonomy and Fault Trees 
To aid in clarifying terminology, a subsystem taxonomy (or system block diagram), 
shown in Figure 66, was constructed based on the generic subsystem taxonomy. This 
diagram lists out various elements, subsystems, and components of the system and was 
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also used to help team members understand conceptually what components should be 
considered for the fault protection process. An example of terminology clarification is the 
naming of various rendezvous cameras, shown in the expansion of Figure 66. Because the 
terms “Narrow Angle Camera” and “Wide Angle Camera” have different meanings in 
different contexts, the rendezvous team developed animal names for each camera. The 
“hawk” is a camera that can see far away, the “dog” is a shorter-range camera with a wider 
field of view, and the “fish” is a very wide-angle camera with a short range. A readable 
version of the complete Subsystem Taxonomy is shown in Appendix C. 
 
Figure 66 – Subsystem taxonomy, with an example expanded [53] 
 An important step in developing fault protection requirements is to perform a fault 
tree analysis. Through discussions with subject-matter experts from the MSR rendezvous 
working group, a fault tree was defined that captures faults that could result in failure of 
the terminal rendezvous phase, as shown in Figure 67. 
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Figure 67 – High-level fault tree for autonomous rendezvous & capture [53] 
 The first discipline considered is Relative Orbit Determination, which involves 
calculating relative position & velocity from rendezvous sensor data. Next is Guidance & 
Control, which is responsible for attitude determination/control and trajectory control 
during rendezvous. In addition, sequencing uses the Virtual Machine Language (VML) to 
direct the autonomous process based on state machines that are developed on the ground 
and loaded onboard [72]. Finally, Capture deals with the mechanical and logical 
components for capturing the OS. 
 An initial fault tree was developed prior to consulting the MSR team. However, in 
order to capture the inputs from JPL experts representing each discipline, various breakout 
meetings were held to revise and expand this initial fault tree. These meetings were 
designed to simply brainstorm, add, remove, rearrange, or rename potential faults from the 
fault tree. Figure 68 shows one example of the results of these breakout sessions. 
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Figure 68 – Result of a fault tree brainstorming session  
for relative orbit determination [53]
 Finally, the results of all the breakout discussions were compiled to create 
comprehensive fault trees. A complete fault tree including over 50 root cause events 
(shown in Appendix D in text form) was constructed to capture all faults specific to 
rendezvous and capture. A second fault tree shown in  
Figure 69 was used to capture generic spacecraft subsystem (non-GN&C) faults that could 
occur during rendezvous and capture.
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Figure 69 – General spacecraft subsystem fault tree [53] 
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4.5.2 MSR Rendezvous & Capture Requirements 
A subset of faults (bolded in the fault tree shown in Appendix D) was selected from 
the completed fault tree. Several representative faults were chosen from each discipline 
(relative orbit determination, guidance & control, sequencing, and capture). The selected 
faults are challenging to detect, diagnose, or respond to in a quick, efficient, and safe way. 
These faults were expanded in detail, and time-to-criticality, detection methods, diagnosis 
methods, and response strategies are examined at various stages of the rendezvous and 
capture process. These details were then used to define a set of potential fault protection 
requirements that accounts for different conditions in different stages of the rendezvous 
process. One example strategy for a single fault is shown in Figure 70, and the related 
possible fault protection requirements are shown in Figure 71. Note that both the time to 
criticality and response strategy for this particular fault are too complex to fit into the table 
in Figure 70 and are described in depth in the following section. Details of strategies and 
requirements for all of the selected faults are provided in Appendix E. After completion of 
these requirements, a second round of breakout meetings was held with technical experts 
in each area to share the results and seek direction for the next steps. 
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Figure 70 – Example fault protection strategy [53] 
 
Figure 71 – Example of possible fault protection requirements [53] 
 
4.6 Fault Detection, Diagnosis, and Recovery Strategy 
An example case (“No OS data received from sensors”) was selected to demonstrate 
how a spacecraft fault protection system may diagnose faults on-board. The fault protection 
architecture utilizes state machines so that fault responses are tied to the state of the system 
rather than simply as a reaction to the detection of symptoms.  
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The study focuses on four faults as a proof of concept. Each of these faults has a very 
similar symptom used for initial detection, but each fault also has a distinct diagnosis and 
response procedure. The four faults are “Sensor Loses Power”, “SRO Angular Rates Too 
Great”, “OS in Eclipse” and “Filter Does Not Converge”. Initial fault detection is 
performed by examining the result of an image processing algorithm developed for the 
Prox-1 small satellite mission [73]. This algorithm receives the simulated sensor image of 
the OS as an input and outputs a simple logical variable called InView. This variable is 
set to 1 if the OS is visible in the image and to 0 if the OS is not visible. An image timer 
tracks the amount of time since the last OS image has been seen, and if this timer surpasses 
a user-defined time threshold (and the OS has been seen previously), then a fault detection 
is triggered. A fault detection can also be triggered by an input variable indicating relative 
orbit filter non-convergence. 
Once a fault is detected, the diagnostic state machine shown in Figure 72 is activated. 
This state machines operates exactly like the generic diagnostic state machine described in 
Section 2.6. The diagnostic state machine consists of two primary states: NoFaultDetected 
and FaultDetected. During all nominal mission phases, NoFaultDetected is activated, but 
when one of the fault detection triggers described above is observed, FaultDetected will be 
activated. If the rendezvous process state machine in Figure 49 has any state active other 
than the Passive Miss or Active Abort Regions (Zones 1 and 2), then the diagnostic state 
machine enters the “Diagnose” state immediately when a fault is detected. If the 
rendezvous process is in the Passive Miss Region (ZonePassive=1) or Active Abort 
Region (ZoneActive=1), then the diagnostic state machine does not attempt to 
determine which fault has occurred. An active or passive abort maneuver is commanded  
 120 
 Figure 72 – Diagnostic state machine for MSR Simulation 
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immediately, returning the spacecraft to a passively safe standby orbit as described in 
Section 4.4.3 before entering the Diagnose state.  
 The Diagnose state consists of sub-states for each possible fault, which operate as 
described in Section 2.6. The “Sensor Loses Power” fault is diagnosed if 
SensorPowerState is equal to zero. “SRO Angular Rate Fault” is diagnosed if the 
maximum absolute value of any element of the angular velocity vector exceeds the user 
defined MaxAllowableRate. “OS in Eclipse” is diagnosed if OSEclipseState is 
equal to one. Finally, “Filter Does Not Converge” is diagnosed if 
FilterConvergenceStatus is equal to zero.  
Once a fault is diagnosed, the diagnostic state machine calls the appropriate fault 
response. If “Sensor Loses Power” is diagnosed, the response is to send a command to reset 
the sensor power. If “SRO Angular Rates Too Great” is diagnosed, the response is to send 
a command to point the rendezvous sensor at the target. If “OS in Eclipse” is diagnosed, 
the response is to turn on a flashlight to enable imaging the OS during eclipse. Finally, if 
“Filter Does Not Converge” is diagnosed, the response is to reset the navigation filter. 
4.7 Evaluation in Simulation 
A simulation has been developed for the MSR application in MATLAB/Simulink to 
evaluate the generic FDIR architecture described in Chapter 2. This investigation builds on 
capabilities developed at Georgia Tech for other projects, including a high-fidelity 
ProxOps GN&C simulation for the Prox-1 small satellite mission [15,31], simulation 
models for feasibility studies of constellations of CubeSats at Mars [32], and a PITL testbed 
for high-fidelity testing of avionics boards for relative ProxOps called SoftSim6D [33].  
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4.7.1 Simulation Description 
An overview of the simulation is shown in Figure 73 and the interaction of various 
components is illustrated by the architecture block diagram in Figure 74. The diagram is 
based on the generic architecture block diagram from Section 2.3.5. It is divided into the 
simulation environment representing the system under control (entity being controlled) and 
the control system (entity exercising the control) according to terminology defined in [5]. 
 




Figure 74 – MSR Simulation Block Diagram 
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The simulation environment is composed of foundational SoftSim6D simulation 
components and state variables that track the status of these models. For example, space 
environment models include time systems, gravitational forces, and orbit perturbations. 
The initial simulation epoch is input as a Gregorian date & time and is then translated into 
a Julian Date. Force and moment perturbations are included for the SRO and OS orbits 
around Mars for J2 non-spherical gravity, third body effects from Phobos and Deimos, 
aerodynamic drag, solar radiation pressure, and gravity gradient. The ephemeris of the Sun 
in the Mars IAU frame is obtained from the JPL SPICE toolkit in order to determine when 
the OS and SRO are in eclipse. The ephemeris of the Earth in the Mars IAU frame is also 
obtained to determine when Earth is occulted by Mars and communication of the SRO with 
the ground is not possible. 
The simulation environment also includes spacecraft dynamic models for inertial 
orbital dynamics, relative orbital dynamics, and attitude dynamics. The inertial orbit and 
attitude of each spacecraft is computed and numerically integrated separately, and the 
relative states are calculated by differencing the inertial states. A detailed model of the 
rendezvous visual sensor has also been developed. This model includes an image 
generation capability originally developed for Prox-1 [15]. The image generator takes the 
relative orbit and attitude of the SRO and OS as inputs to generate a simulated image of 
the OS as seen by the camera on the SRO. A screenshot of the Simulink sensor model 
(unreadable, but with descriptive labels) and a simulated image are shown in Figure 75.  
In order for an image to be generated, the OS must be within the field of view (FOV) 
of the sensor, the sensor power must be turned on, and the OS must be in sunlight (not in 
eclipse). The sensor power model is a logical variable representing on/off states as 0 or 1. 
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The model features a fault injection capability which causes the sensor to lose power at a 
specified input time. Sensor power can be restored by sending a sensor reset command. 
There is also a flashlight model, which is a simple on/off state represented by 0 or 1. If the 
OS is in eclipse, the flashlight can be activated by a “flashlight on” command to illuminate 
it, allowing an image to be generated in the absence of sunlight.  
 
It should be noted that additional generic spacecraft sensor and actuator models are 
included in the SoftSim6D suite, but for simplicity in this study perfect state knowledge 
and control input execution is assumed (including impulsive ΔV maneuvers) and these 
sensor and actuator models are not utilized. Of course relaxing these assumptions would 
Figure 75 – Screenshot of rendezvous sensor model & simulated OS image 
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Rotations 




Location in FOV 
 126 
provide a greater degree of realism to the simulation, but for the faults examined in this 
study it was not necessary. 
The next segment of the block diagram in Figure 74 is the Control System, which is 
arranged according to the generic state-based architecture containing components for state 
determination (evaluating evidence to determine the current state), state variables 
(maintaining state knowledge), and state control (computing control commands) [5]. There 
are two types of components in the Control System: GN&C Software Components which 
are focused on simulating the spacecraft’s orbit & attitude control subsystem and 
Fault/Mode components which are used for FDIR and spacecraft mode management.  
First, it should be noted that state determination for spacecraft dynamics and 
component states is not simulated explicitly through estimation algorithms. Instead, “truth” 
states from the simulation components are fed in directly to the control system as state 
variables. Dynamic states treated in this manner include spacecraft inertial and relative 
positions and velocities, attitudes and attitude rates, and eclipse/occultation status. This is 
in accordance with the assumption of perfect state knowledge mentioned above. Although 
navigation filter algorithms are not simulated, a variable representing filter convergence 
status is included in the simulation and is used to evaluate how the fault protection system 
responds to situations where such algorithms are not converged via user-defined fault 
injection. Sensor power status is also fed directly from the rendezvous sensor model into 
the Control System. 
The spacecraft six-degree-of-freedom (6DOF) control includes two components: 
attitude target tracking and relative trajectory control. The attitude target tracking algorithm 
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is identical to the algorithm developed for Prox-1 using a small satellite Control Moment 
Gyroscope [15], which points the camera boresight along the negative relative position 
vector. Because the simulation assumes perfect relative position and attitude knowledge, 
pointing the camera in this direction allows images of the OS to be generated by the 
rendezvous sensor model. As mentioned previously, perfect control input execution is 
assumed, so the torque commanded by the attitude target tracking algorithm is 
instantaneously imparted to the spacecraft attitude dynamics model. ROE-based relative 
trajectory control algorithms are also implemented to realize the concept of operations 
described in Section 4.4. Maneuvers are calculated dynamically and commanded onboard 
the SRO based on the current relative state rather than at preset times.  
4.7.2 Simulation Results 
A closed-loop V&V test of the FDIR system has been performed using SITL testing 
in the MATLAB/Simulink simulation described in the previous section. The initial relative 
orbit conditions are the same as those described in Section 4.4.3. The following rendezvous 
strategy parameters are also specified for the simulation. The maximum ΔV of the SRO is 
set to 0.25 m/s. This is used to determine when the SRO enters the Unavoidable Intercept 
Region. The capture distance is set to 1 m. This is used to determine when capture has 
occurred since the simulation does not include rigid body capture dynamics. The minimum 
safe distance is set to 10 m. This is used to determine the size of the safety ellipse for aborts. 
The standby distance is set to 50 m. This is used to determine when to end an abort; the 
SRO performs a maneuver to return to passively safe standby only after it has drifted this 
distance away from the OS in the along-track direction. 
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4.7.2.1 Nominal Approach 
In Case 1, a nominal approach is performed, as shown in Figure 76. In this scenario, 
the SRO proceeds all the way to capture, with no faults injected and no recovery actions 
taken. A minimum range of 1 m occurs at 20,534 seconds, and the simulation ends to 
 
Figure 76 – Simulation Results for Case 1: Nominal Approach 
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represent capture. Note that this scenario is identical to the one presented in Section 4.4.4.1, 
except that no hold position maneuver is performed at the end of the simulation. However, 
unlike the previous scenario, this simulation does not assume linearized dynamics but 
propagates the full inertial orbits for both the SRO and the OS non-linearly and includes 
orbital perturbations. The simulation also includes a full 6DOF propagation including 
attitude dynamics. 
4.7.2.2 Faults Prior to V-Bar Approach 
Next, three scenarios are performed where different faults are injected during the 
planar hop prior to the start of the v-bar approach. In each of these scenarios the fault 
protection system successfully detects, diagnoses and responds to the fault and proceeds to 
capture the OS. 
In Case 2, an angular rate fault results in the loss of the OS from the imager FOV. 
A fault is injected at 1,050 sec during the planar hop by turning off the attitude tracking 
controller. The OS slowly drifts out of the imager FOV until it is no longer visible, 
triggering a fault detection. The fault protection system then initiates a sky search slew, 
which scans the sky and quickly finds and tracks the OS again, as shown in the attitude and 
angular velocity plots in Figure 77. Note that only the portion of the simulation near the 
fault detection and recovery is shown for clarity. After reacquiring the OS in the imager 
FOV, the SRO continues to capture the OS at 20,534 sec and a minimum range of 1 m, as 
in Case 1. Note that the slew used for the sky search was designed for a small satellite with 
an agile attitude control system. For an actual SRO implementation, the slew rate would 
likely be much lower. 
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In Case 3, the OS enters eclipse at 5,005 sec during the planar hop. The OS image 
is no longer visible in the sensor FOV, triggering a fault detection. Once the planar hop is 
complete, the system enters a position hold until eclipse ends before beginning the v-bar 
approach at 6,411 sec. This is seen in Figure 78 as a zero relative velocity in all axes and a 
constant relative position in all axes. After eclipse ends, the SRO continues to capture the 
OS at 22,978 sec and a minimum range of 1.4 m. Note that this scenario indicates that the 
SRO’s autonomous system is “surprised” by the eclipse. Since eclipse is very predictable 
based on the Mars IAU ephemerides of the OS and the Sun, the autonomous system and 
ground support systems should be designed to anticipate and accommodate eclipse in the 
final rendezvous approach strategy. 
In Case 4, a fault is injected at 5,400 sec during the planar hop indicating that the 
relative orbit determination filter is unconverged. The fault protection system detects this 
fault and commands a filter reset, which takes about 100 seconds to confirm. As in Case 3, 
the SRO enters a position hold until the fault is resolved before beginning the v-bar 
approach, as shown in Figure 79. Note that only the portion of the simulation near the fault 
detection and recovery is shown for clarity. The SRO then continues to capture the OS at 
20,618 sec and a minimum range of 1 m. 
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4.7.2.3 Faults During V-Bar Approach 
Finally, two scenarios are simulated where different faults are injected during the 
v-bar approach. In each of these scenarios, the fault protection system successfully detects 
the fault and immediately proceeds to a passive or active abort, bypassing the diagnostic 
step. This is the desired behavior specified by the requirements described in Section 4.5. 
In Case 5, a fault is injected at 6,000 sec indicating that the relative orbit 
determination filter is unconverged, similar to Case 4. Unlike Case 4 however, in this 
scenario the planar hop has already been completed and the v-bar approach has begun 
before the fault is injected. The fault protection system detects the fault and immediately 
commands a passive abort because the SRO is in the Passive Miss Region (Zone 1) of the 
v-bar approach. The SRO then stops maneuvers and begins drifting. It passes through a 
minimum range of 24.23 m at 8,706 sec (about 30 minutes after the fault time). After this 
minimum range, the SRO drifts away from the OS in the negative along-track direction, as 
shown in Figure 80. As in the scenario described in Section 4.4.4.2, once the along-track 
distance reaches 50 m the SRO injects cross-track motion and returns to a passively safe 
out-of-plane standby trajectory. 
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Figure 80 – Simulation Results for Case 5: Unconverged Relative Orbit Filter 
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In Case 6, a camera power fault is injected at 19,000 sec during the v-bar approach. 
The OS image is no longer visible in the sensor FOV, triggering a fault detection. The fault 
protection system detects this fault and immediately commands an active abort because the 
SRO is in the Active Abort Region (Zone 2) of the v-bar approach. The SRO then injects 
out-of-plane cross-track motion and begins drifting away from the OS in the negative 
along-track direction, as shown in Figure 81. This location becomes the point of closest 
approach at a range of 4.32 m. As in the scenario described in Section 4.4.4.3, once the 
along-track distance reaches 50 m the SRO freezes the along-track drift to return to the 
passively safe standby trajectory. A summary of all six simulation test cases is shown in 
Table 4. 
Table 4 – Simulation test case summary 









1 Nominal approach n/a n/a n/a 1 m 20,534 sec 
2 Angular rate results in 
loss of OS from FOV 
1,050 sec Planar Hop Recovery 1 m 20,534 sec 
3 OS enters eclipse 5,005 sec Planar Hop Recovery 1.4 m 22,978 sec 
4 Unconverged Relative 
Orbit filter (before v-bar)  
5,400 sec Planar Hop Recovery 1 m 20,618 sec 
5 Unconverged Relative 
Orbit  filter (during v-bar) 




24.23 m 8,706 sec 
6 Camera power fault  
(during v-bar) 








Figure 81 – Simulation Results for Case 6: Camera Power Fault 
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5


















0 = No Fault Detected, 1 = Fault Detected
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5



























0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5





























Each of the tasks described above has been completed successfully for an initial 
treatment of defining fault protection behavior for autonomous rendezvous and capture of 
the OS. A detailed fault tree has been defined, along with a detailed rendezvous and capture 
process concept of operations and a system block diagram. Initial fault protection strategies 
and requirements have been generated for a total of about 20 key faults from the various 
discipline areas. The architecture has been tested in simulation for several fault cases. 
One goal of introducing fault protection earlier in the design cycle (during Pre-Phase 
A mission formulation) has been to help guide mission design considerations. One major 
observation is that the process of fault protection has been a forcing function for the MSR 
mission formulation team to clarify architecture and concept of operation decisions. In 
some cases, mission design and concept of operations assumptions have been documented 
for the first time. This has been an unexpected but welcome result, showing the value of 
fault protection not just as an add-on to a space mission design but as an essential 
component of the system design from the beginning. 
Defining terminology clearly is very important. There have been miscommunications 
at several meetings because of different understandings for the definitions of certain 
terminology. For example, although terms like “guidance, navigation, & control” have 
fairly standard definitions, they may have different connotations in different contexts. Even 
the term “fault protection” means different things to different people. This challenge has 
been addressed by inviting open discussion and feedback in group meetings and by 
attempting to clarify any terms that could be confusing or misunderstood when they are 
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presented. When developing tools like a fault tree, it is important to anticipate how terms 
will be understood by team members from various disciplines and define any terms that 
may be misinterpreted.  
Another challenge has been determining what to do next when each step is 
completed. Since a new method of fault protection design is being experimented with, there 
is not a defined process to follow. A final challenge has been a backlog in the 
communication of progress throughout the project. Because of the cadence of meeting 
cycles, work was often completed several weeks before it could be communicated to all 
relevant stakeholders. These challenges have been addressed by seeking additional 
direction and advice of fault protection experts and rendezvous/capture subject matter 
experts. Their suggestions helped refine the direction of the study 
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CHAPTER 5.  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
5.1 Conclusions 
This study has presented a fault protection architecture for aerospace vehicles that 
is generic, modular, and portable to flight software and enables model-based on-board fault 
diagnosis using the state machine paradigm. The architecture is generic and can be applied 
to any aerospace vehicle or mission. It features a generic simulation capability used for 
development, verification, & validation. Multiple applications have been used to 
demonstrate the generic utility of the architecture in simulation and flight tests. The 
architecture is also modular and contains components that can be added, removed, and 
rearranged easily. Environment models, vehicle sensor & actuator models, and dynamics 
models can be selected, modified, and rearranged in the simulation block diagram. Initial 
conditions, vehicle properties, and environmental scenarios can be easily redefined in an 
initialization script. The architecture is portable to flight software and it is straightforward 
to convert the initial design into flight software that is flown onboard the vehicle. An 
autocoding process has been defined and demonstrated for the Prox-1 small satellite. 
The generic architecture is composed of five primary diagrams. A generic 
subsystem taxonomy defines the primary subsystems common to most aerospace vehicles 
and details common components for the guidance, navigation, & control subsystem. A 
generic fault tree analysis defines a process for determining which root cause and 
intermediate fault events could lead to an undesirable vehicle or mission failure. A generic 
functional state machine provides a model of vehicle mode state behavior by detailing 
processes common to many aerospace missions. A generic diagnostic state machine has 
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been developed to enable on-board model-based diagnosis of faults. Lastly, a generic 
architecture block diagram illustrates how the fault and mode components work together 
with vehicle and environmental components to perform fault protection in simulation and 
in flight. A process has been defined for adapting the generic architecture to specific 
applications, and two case studies have been demonstrated for very different applications. 
The first case study of the fault protection architecture is a terrestrial application 
for unmanned aerial vehicles known as the UAV Nervous System. The concept for the 
nervous system has been developed in collaboration with a company called FalconViz 
based at the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology in Thuwal, Saudi 
Arabia. A subsystem taxonomy and fault tree have been constructed and used to design a 
system to detect excess propeller vibration using supervised machine learning algorithms 
and alert the pilot by playing an audible signal from the radio hand controller. Upgrades 
have been added to the system to allow detection of propeller vibration faults, motor 
temperature faults, and electrical current/voltage faults on two arms of a six-arm rotary 
wing UAV simultaneously. These capabilities have been successfully demonstrated 
through flight testing. Finally, functional and diagnostic state machines have been created 
for the vibration detection case to develop a full fault protection architecture block diagram. 
The full architecture has been demonstrated in simulation using recorded flight test data. 
Flight tests and simulation using flight test data have demonstrated desired detection, 
diagnosis, and response performance for excess vibration faults and desired detection and 
response performance for temperature, current, and voltage faults. 
The second case study of the fault protection architecture is a space-based 
proximity operations application for autonomous terminal rendezvous and capture of a 
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Mars Sample Return orbiting sample container. The concept and requirements for the fault 
protection architecture have been developed in collaboration with the Mars Sample Return 
team at the NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory. A subsystem taxonomy, detailed rendezvous 
and capture fault tree, and concept of operations including a functional state machine have 
been developed with input from subject-matter experts at JPL. Detailed trajectory design 
has been completed for nominal approach, passive abort, and active abort scenarios, and 
autonomous trajectory control logic has been developed and demonstrated in simulation. 
A diagnostic state machine has been implemented in concert with diagnostic and response 
routines to detect and correct four distinct faults in various phases of autonomous approach. 
Each of these faults has similar detection criteria but distinct diagnostic and resolution 
processes. Abort logic has also been developed and demonstrated when faults occur during 
regions that risk the sample return orbiter colliding with the orbiting sample return canister.  
All of these components have been combined into an integrated fault protection 
architecture and demonstrated in simulation using realistic guidance, simulation, & control 
algorithms and components. Six simulation cases have been evaluated, and in each scenario 
the behavior of the fault protection architecture is consistent with desired results for fault 
detection, diagnosis, and recovery in accordance with the defined requirements. 
In summary, a generic, modular, and portable architecture has been developed for 
aerospace vehicle fault protection. The architecture has been adapted to two distinct 
scenarios and has demonstrated the ability to successfully detect, diagnose, and respond to 
a variety of faults in real time using a state-based on-board system. Flight testing and 
detailed simulation have been used to thoroughly develop, verify, and validate this 
capability. A summary of all tasks for this investigation is shown in Table 5. 
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Table 5 – Task summary for this investigation 
Status Task Completion Date 
Complete Initial FDIR literature review Oct 2015 
Complete Initial FDIR architecture concept development Apr 2016 
Complete UAV Nervous System proof-of-concept July 2016 
Complete UAV Nervous System initial V&V flight tests July 2016 
Complete UAV Nervous System conference paper [41] Oct 2016 
Complete Dissertation proposal Jan 2017 
Complete UAV Nervous System expansion June 2017 
Complete UAV Nervous System final V&V flight tests June 2017 
Complete MSR fault tree and requirements definition July 2017 
Complete MSR FDIR conference paper [53] Sept 2017 
Complete FDIR literature review revision Dec 2017 
Complete MSR FDIR detailed design Jan 2018 
Complete MSR FDIR SITL V&V Mar 2018 
Complete Submit MSR FDIR peer-reviewed journal article [74] Apr 2018 
Complete Generic FDIR architecture detailed design Apr 2018 
Complete Demonstration of generic architecture  with UAV flight test data May 2018 
Complete Dissertation defense June 2018 





In addition to the dissertation proposal and defense, several relevant publications are 
planned or completed. Other publications by the author are also listed.  
Peer-Reviewed Journal Articles: 
[15] P.Z. Schulte, D.A. Spencer, Development of an Integrated Spacecraft Guidance, 
Navigation, & Control Subsystem for Automated Proximity Operations, Acta 
Astronautica, 118 (Jan-Feb 2016), 168-186, doi:10.1016/j.actaastro.2015.10.010. 
[31] D.A. Spencer, S.B. Chait, P.Z. Schulte, K.J. Okseniuk, M. Veto, Prox-1 University-
Class Mission to Demonstrate Automated Proximity Operations, Journal of 
Spacecraft and Rockets, July 2016, doi:10.2514/1.A33526. 
 
[74] P.Z. Schulte, D.A. Spencer, M. Goggin, Mars Sample Return Terminal Rendezvous 
Fault Protection, Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets, submitted Apr. 2018. 
 
[75] P.Z. Schulte, D.A. Spencer, Generic State Machine Fault Protection Architecture for 
Aerospace Vehicle Guidance, Navigation, & Control, Journal of Aerospace 
Information Systems, submitted Jun. 2018. 
 
Conference Papers Relevant to This Work: 
[76] P.Z. Schulte, D.A. Spencer, Development of an Integrated Spacecraft Guidance, 
Navigation, & Control Subsystem for Automated Proximity Operations, 65th 
International Astronautical Congress, Toronto, Canada, Oct. 2014, IAC-14-
C1.6.4x21108. 
 
[77] K.J. Okseniuk, S.B. Chait, P.Z. Schulte, D.A. Spencer, Prox-1: Automated Proximity 
Operations on an ESPA Class Platform, 29th AIAA/USU Conference on Small 
Satellites, Logan, Utah, Aug. 2015. 
 
[41] P.Z. Schulte, D.A. Spencer, N.G. Smith, M.F. McCabe, Development of a Fault 
Protection Architecture Based Upon State Machines, 67th International Astronautical 
Congress, Guadalajara, Mexico, Sept. 2016, IAC-16-D1.IP.2x32540. 
 
[53] P.Z. Schulte, D.A. Spencer, State Machine Fault Protection for Automated Proximity 




[54] P.Z. Schulte, D.A. Spencer, Fault Protection for Mars Sample Return Autonomous 
Rendezvous & Capture, Symposium on Space Innovations, Atlanta, Georgia, Oct. 
2017. (poster and presentation only) 
 
[78] P.Z. Schulte, D.A. Spencer, On-Board Model-Based Fault Diagnosis for Autonomous 
Proximity Operations, 69th International Astronautical Congress, Bremen, Germany, 
Sept. 2018, IAC-18-C1.6x45016. (abstract accepted) 
 
 
Other Conference Papers: 
 
[79] P.Z. Schulte, J.W. Moore, A.L Morris, Verification and Validation of Requirements 
on the CEV Parachute Assembly System Using Design of Experiments, AIAA-2011-
2558, 21st AIAA Aerodynamic Decelerator Systems Conference and Seminar, 
Dublin, Ireland, May 2011. 
 
[80] P.Z. Schulte, E.G. Lightsey, K.B. Brumbaugh, R.L Staehle, Utilization of a Solar Sail 
to Perform a Lunar CubeSat Science Mission, 2nd Interplanetary CubeSat Workshop, 
Ithaca, New York, May 2013. (presentation only; paper withheld by sponsor) 
 
[81] Pellegrino, M., Gibson, A., Mariscal, J.C., Schulte, P., “UNISPACE+50: Shared 
Vision, Common Action,” 68th International Astronautical Congress, Adelaide, 
Australia, Sept. 2017, IAC-17-E3.1.1x37185. 
 
 
5.3 Suggestions for Future Work 
This section presents possible extensions on this study. The suggestions for future 
work are organized based on the chapter divisions of this dissertation. 
5.3.1 Generic Fault Protection Architecture 
As described in Section 2.3.1, the subsystem taxonomy for the generic fault 
protection architecture lists generic subsystems for aerospace vehicles, but it only presents 
detailed generic components for the guidance, navigation, & control subsystem. It would 
be useful to add detailed components to the taxonomy for all subsystems. It addition, it 
would be beneficial to modify the generic subsystem taxonomy, fault tree, and functional 
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state machine to be more object oriented and automated. It would also be helpful to define 
more detailed generic classes of faults for the fault tree and diagnostic state machine and 
link them to taxonomy and functional state machine. As indicated by Rasmussen, robust 
fault protection requires a measure of uncertainty [5], so it is desirable to formally define 
such a measure for use in fault diagnosis. Also, future researchers could utilize the generic 
fault protection architecture to implement and evaluate more advanced diagnostic 
capabilities [25], including constraint suspension [28-29] and other techniques 
demonstrated on Deep Space One [24] and Cassini [26,27]. The generic architecture could 
facilitate the use of these diagnosis methods for a wide variety of aerospace applications.  
One possible method for these extensions would be to use the formal ontologies for 
fault protection and behavior modelling defined by JPL using SysML [12,22]. These 
formal ontologies might also be useful to define a more automated process to convert the 
generic architecture to a particular application and for developing content. For example, a 
future study could implement a “fault tree to state machine” algorithm to create the 
diagnostic state machine and link it to the functional state machine [40]. Such a process 
could also be used to populate each of the diagrams with content that is linked to other 
systems engineering processes for projects using formal methods for modelling. Finally, it 
would be immensely useful to extend the generic fault protection architecture beyond 
aerospace applications for domains such terrestrial robotics and autonomous cars. 
5.3.2 UAV Nervous System 
A next step to extend the UAV nervous system would be to expand the number of 
sensors with a full suite of vibration, temperature, current, and voltage sensors on each arm 
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of the six arm hexacopter. Fault detection can be performed on all arms independently and 
simultaneously. Then, if a propeller imbalance or other fault is detected, the nervous system 
can indicate which propeller needs to be balanced. Similarly, temperature and 
current/voltage sensors can be placed on each motor and ESC and the nervous system can 
record all variables as a function of time and indicate to UAV designers and operators 
which components tend to overheat or break first. 
Further sensors can also be added to expand the set of detectable failures. For 
example, many times when there is a problem with a UAV the first indication to the 
operators is an unusual sound. Thus, microphones collecting audio data near each propeller 
may be able to provide additional warning of faults. Data from microphones could be 
processed through a machine learning algorithm similarly to the acceleration data. 
Examples of other issues/failures on the UAVs that could be addressed by future work 
include monitoring the GPS receiver and magnetic compass (which can malfunction in 
flight, leading to the regularly reported problem of “fly-aways”), adding tachometers to 
detect changes in blade rotating speed, and ensuring healthy navigation filters (i.e. GPS 
position/velocity and attitude determination for roll/pitch/yaw angles and rates). 
Monitoring navigation variables would require communication with the flight controller, 
but redundant navigation systems could also aid in detecting navigation errors. 
 Another necessary update to the nervous system is smoothing out the startup 
process. Although quite convenient for prototyping and rapid development and testing, 
running Simulink in Windows onboard the copter is not a very elegant solution. It requires 
manually starting up Windows and initiating the Simulink model on a lab bench while 
connected to a monitor, then carrying the copter outside to begin flying. An intermediate 
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step is to set up a high-definition video downlink to interact with Simulink in the field. 
Ultimately it would be desirable to remove the Windows/Simulink component from the 
system completely and perform all fault detection and data recording directly on the Teensy 
with a Secure Digital (SD) card shield attached. The Teensy can be fully customized by 
programming in C, and Simulink has the capability to generate C code via autocoding. If a 
simple KNN classification detection algorithm is implemented in C (or if an autocodable 
MATLAB algorithm is available), it can be integrated with autocode from Simulink and 
sensor interface code directly on the Teensy. This would streamline the process for using 
the nervous system and make it much easier to seamlessly integrate it with a copter. 
5.3.3 Mars Sample Return Rendezvous & Capture 
 There is potential for some of the Mars Sample Return work to continue at JPL by 
adding more detail for the SRO rendezvous and capture FP strategy and by extending these 
FP concepts to other aspects of MSR concept development. Some of these methods could 
also be fed back into JPL’s general fault protection processes to continue to advance state-
based fault protection (especially diagnosis) for future missions. In retrospect, there are a 
few things that could be done differently in the Mars Sample Return study based on lessons 
learned. It would make sense to build the fault tree with a more functional structure rather 
than one based on rendezvous discipline areas. For example, if the OS is not seen in the 
rendezvous sensor’s field of view, there could be an issue with relative orbit determination, 
attitude control, or sequencing that could cause this. The current version of the fault tree 
places this fault under relative orbit determination and not the other two branches. A more 
functional structure was suggested by a JPL fault protection expert, but the work was 
already far enough along that it was decided to leave the fault tree in its current format. 
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Additionally, several changes could be made to the simulation to make it more useful 
for Mars Sample Return mission designers. Adding maneuver execution error would make 
the sim more robust for evaluating additional faults. It would also be useful to include 
attitude and relative orbit filters for more realistic evaluation of fault protection 
performance with uncertain state information and for evaluating FDIR performance for 
filter faults. Collaborator McClain Goggin is developing a tool that allows the user to easily 
create and compare rendezvous trajectories and evaluate them based on passive safety and 
the probability of collision. In order to accurately evaluate the passive safety, the user will 
be able to select from a range of default sensor and filter models (or add their own) so that 
the state uncertainty covariance can be accurately determined for each case. 
As mentioned in Section 4.7.2, several changes to the detailed implementation of the 
MSR fault protection architecture are necessary before a flight implementation is 
developed. The sky search slew rate used for reacquiring the OS when it drifts out of the 
sensor FOV should be adjusted for a large SRO spacecraft. Also, the autonomous system 
and ground support systems should be designed to anticipate and accommodate eclipse in 
the rendezvous approach strategy. In addition, detailed capture dynamics should be 
modeled and included in the analysis. Care should be taken when defining the transition 
between Zone 2 (Active Abort Region) and Zone 3 (Unavoidable Intercept Region) to 
ensure that active abort maneuvers have no chance of the SRO impacting the OS if the 
aborts are performed at a very close range. This is especially necessary if relative orbit 
information is lost during the abort. One way to account for this situation is to add margin 
to the capture distance, but regardless the amount of margin added should be determined 
by analysis. 
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APPENDIX A: AUTOCODING TECHNICAL MEMOS 
 
This appendix is referenced by Section 2.2.3 and contains two technical memos written at 
Georgia Tech by the Prox-1 small satellite Guidance, Navigation, & Control team, of which 
the author was the subsystem lead. These memos describe the autocoding process which 
was developed for converting the GN&C subsystem code developed in 
MATLAB/Simulink to C/C++. Although MATLAB/Simulink has the capability to 
generate autocode, some small modifications and configuration setting changes were 
required for the process to work properly. 
 
Technical Memorandum 
December 2, 2014 
 
TO: Prox-1 Design Team 
 
FROM: Meet Raj Patel & Jacob Sussman  
 
SUBJECT: Autocoding of GN&C MasterSim  
 
REFERENCES:      
(1) Fraticelli, J., “Simulink Code Generation: Tutorial for generating C code from 
Simulink Models using Simulink Coder,” NASA Marshall Space Flight Center, 2012. 
(2) “Call MATLAB Functions,” Simulink Documentation, Mathworks, 2013. 
[http://www.mathworks.com/help/simulink/ug/calling-matlab-
functions.html#bq1h2z9-48]. 




This document provides guidelines for generating C code from an individual GN&C 
module and the entire developed GN&C Master Simulation of PROX-1. In order to 
successfully achieve the code generation process, specific steps have been documented 
along with appropriate reasoning. Common errors are also documented in this report. The 
report is divided in two main sections: 
1. Assembling & Running the simulation  
2. Autocoding procedure  
 
 For this report, examples are given specifically using the 
“HIL_6DOF_MasterSim3-_APF_NoNav” Simulink model. Autocoding any other 
MasterSim should be fairly similar to this report’s design. Considerations for 
future MasterSim releases are addressed when appropriate and are preceded with 
the same bullet point used for this section. 
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[NOTE: Good ideas that have yet to be implemented or properly looked into will be 
encased in square brackets and preceded by “NOTE:” in bold letters. If agreeable to 
those in command, they should be implemented in the Spring 2015 semester.] 
Assembling & Running the Simulation  
Steps:  
• Open T-square, and download GNC_Current folder. Make sure to download the 
recent working folder of the simulation. After downloading and unzipping the file 
check that it has the following subfolders: Control, Documentation, Guidance, 
Navigation and SimArchitecture. Re-download if necessary. Open the 
“SimArchitecture” folder. The image shown below shows the subfolders. 
 
 
•  Access “MasterSim_3.0” folder and open “HIL_6DOF_MasterSim3_APF_ 
NoNav” Simulink model. Multiple graphic windows, Matlab main window and 




• In the “HIL_6DOF_MasterSim3_APF_NoNav” Simulink window there should be 
few un-referenced blocks. There modules appear to look red since model-
referencing is required. Right click on those blocks (the one with red dotted blocks), 







• The preceding image shows the model reference block which includes “Model 
name” under “Parameters” window. Click on “Browse” and select the file name 
corresponding to the model name. For instance, “Slew_Controller_Model4” file 
Simulink model file is selected from the main GNC Control folder. After the file is 
selected, a prompt may ask to add the selected model to the current path. Click 
“Add path” and continue. The red dotted module will now turn its boundary into a 
darker one to signify that the model is found and ready to be used. 
 
 
• Follow the similar procedure for rest of the modules with red dotted unreferenced 
model. For current Sim model, model referencing should be made for 
“Slew&Tracking” model, “Detumble” model and Prox-1 Hardware and spacecraft 
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plant model. In order to reference the Prox-1 Hardware and spacecraft plant model, 
click on the model. This will open a sub-model consisting of “Prox-1 Hardware 
Models”, “Prox-1 Spacecraft Plant”, “Prox-1 Sensor Suit” and “Power Production 
Models”. Select the “Prox-1 Hardware Models”. 
 
• Inside this “Prox-1 Hardware Models” there are 4 sub-models. 
‘Thurster_SMC’,’TorqueRod_SMC’,’UT_Austin_Thruster’ and ‘TorqueRod_ 
Hardware’. Referencing each model is not required; referencing just one model out 
of 4 will suffice.  This is because each of these models are in the same folder, so 
that when the path to the folder is added for one of the models Simulink 
automatically detects the others. The Final Sim is shown below: 
 
 Future MasterSim releases will have more externally-referenced sub-
models, but the process for adding them is the same: click the broken 
model link, find the model, add the folder path. 
 
• Time to initialize the workspace environment. Make sure to run the initialization 
file from the current folder in main Matlab window. For this demonstration, open 
any of the following matlab.m files located in the same folder as the MasterSim 
model: HIL_6DOF_MasterSim3_Init_NMC.m, HIL_6DOF_MasterSim3_ 
RestToRest.m,  or HIL_6DOF_MasterSim3_Init_LeadingOrbit.m. Running one of 
these files will initialize various model simulation parameters, e.g., the mass of the 





 Later MasterSim versions may require more than one initialization file to 
run. For example, the current version of MasterSim 4 (as of December 
2014) requires an additional “SpacecraftPlant_EnvironmentModel_Init.m” 
file to be run pre-simulation in order to function properly. If you are unsure 
about how many initialization files are required for the current MasterSim 
ask someone in the know. [NOTE: An up-to-date document should be put 
in the MasterSim folder detailing the initialization files needed to properly 
run the current MasterSim.] 
 
• Go back to the main Simulink file and run the simulation. Any errors cause during 
the simulation will be related to errors in the .m input file or a built error of 
Simulink. Any other source of error in running the simulation should be addressed 
and tackled by interpreting the error details provided by Matlab. 
  
• If the run is successful then the plots of simulation variables will update with each 
time-step. If you can, check that the plots make sense. If you already closed every 
plot you can reopen a target plot by double-clicking on the respective scope block, 




Autocoding Procedure  
Now that the simulation is up and running the autocoding process can begin. The principles 
of this process can be distilled into 5 parts:  
1. Documentation: Organizing what you learned from trial and error. Prevents re-
inventing the wheel. See: this report. 
2. Configuration: Certain configuration parameters should be in place for a smooth 
autocoding experience.  Changing these parameters (especially the hardware 
configuration settings) will initially prevent proper simulation of the model. 
3. Simulation: After setting the configuration parameters, the model needs to be set 
up again so that it can properly run as before. This time, however, the model can 
go through the Code Generation process. 
4. Generation: Code Generation is the cornerstone of autocoding. If the model is set 
up right, then the Simulink Coder should be able to convert the simulation into C 
code. 
5. Compilation: The final autocoding step consists of compiling the C code to run on 
the BeagleBoard and adding possibly preprocessor directives to analyze the C 
model in real-time.  
Configuration 
Steps:  
• Locate the BlankConfig file. This is a Simulink model that is entirely empty save 
for its configuration parameter settings. This BlankConfig file was created in order 
to speed up the Configuration part of the Autocoding process. Simply copy the 
entire MasterSim and paste it into the BlankConfig file. Close the original model 
and save the newly-pasted model as the original MasterSim file (or some closely 





• If this is done correctly and the BlankConfig file has the right settings then 
Configuration is done. When dealing with new models, however, the settings may 
not be properly set up. What follows is a guide for what configuration settings are 
some of the most important. 
 
• To access a model’s Configuration Settings first click the ‘Simulation’ tab and then 
click the ‘Model Configuration Parameters’ button. A GUI should open containing 
the configuration settings. With ‘Solver’ selected the source file template is chosen 
as ‘ert_code_template.cgt’. ‘.cgt’ stands for Code Generation Template, and ‘ert’ 
stands for Embedded Real Time. This file contains a template for the Coder to base 
its code generation off of. This .cgt file must be selected for other settings to 
function (notably the package and zip function which only appears to exist in this 
template file). ‘Generate an example main program’ is checked in order to simplify 





• In the ‘Optimization’ selection, and under ‘Accelerating simulations’ the Compiler 
optimization level is set for faster runs. This will make the building of the C code 
take longer but the resulting code will be more efficient. Taking more time now in 






• In the ‘Signals and Parameters’ menu, ‘Enable local block outputs’, ‘Reuse local 
block outputs’, ‘Eliminate superfluous local variables (expression folding)’, and 
‘Reuse global block outputs’ are all checked in order to make the C code more 
efficient. [NOTE: Flight Software has expressed an interest in the use of Inline 
parameters. Effective use of inline parameters can results in cleaner, faster C code. 
Configuring inline parameters should be looked into.] 
 
• Under ‘Hardware Implementation’ the right production hardware needs to be 
selected for the BeagleBoard XM. It has an ARM Cortex processor and each option 
for this device has been personally checked with the hardware itself to make sure 
they are correct for the BeagleBoard. The byte ordering is Little Endian. The signed 
integer division rounds to zero. The signed integer arithmetic shift is a shift right. 
And long long is an enabled variable. The test hardware should be set to the 
MATLAB Host Computer. The ‘Hardware Implementation’ menu is what messes 
up the ability for the model to simulate as before. In the simulation section it will 




• Similar to previous options, under ‘Code Generation’ the system target file must be 
set to ‘ert.tlc’ in order for certain settings to be active, ‘Build Configuration’ should 
be set to ‘Faster Runs’ to trade off time wasted now versus time wasted later, and 
the ‘Prioritized Objectives’ are set to Execution, RAM and ROM efficiency to 
speed up the C code. Also in this menu, the ‘Package code and artifacts’ must be 
checked. It forces the Coder to zip up every required file for the C program into one 
zip file. If this is not checked then you must individually find certain header files 
in your computer’s MATLAB root. This is not an easy task, and it is arduous work. 
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• Finally, another very helpful option to check off is ‘Create code generation report’ 
located under ‘Code Generation’ and ‘Report’. This allows you to see the generated 
C code in a user-friendly way once the code is finished building. 
 
 Future versions of MasterSim will likely break with these current settings. 
Each new model requires understanding and configuring more new 
configuration parameters. This is one of the most tedious parts of the 





• With the new Configuration settings the MasterSim will likely not run. This is 
because changing the settings for the MasterSim does not automatically change the 
settings in all of the externally-linked submodels. Clashing settings crashes the 
simulation. And if you can’t run the simulation then you definitely can’t generate 
code from it. To fix this, open up an offending external model, and then copy and 
paste it into the MasterSim. Link up the new subsystem just like the old one and 
then promptly delete the old link from existence. Congratulations, the new 
subsystem is an actual part of the MasterSim now (not just a link) and it has 
inherited all of the configuration parameters of the MasterSim. Repeat for every 
externally-linked model. [NOTE: This entire process and the whole BlankConfig 
trick also might be negated or greatly simplified through the use of Configuration 
Reference. Look into for the future.] 
Generation 
Steps: 
• Highlight every piece of the MasterSim that will not be autocoded (Environment 
need not be included), right click, and select ‘Create Subsystem From Selection’. 
Do the same for what will be autocoded. You should have two main subsystems 
now. Right click the subsystem to be autocoded, scroll over ‘C/C++ Code’ and 
select ‘Build This Subsystem’. The actual autocoding process should now begin. 
Confirm the decision to build the code on any screens that may appear and let the 
Coder do its work. 
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 In all MasterSim versions starting at version 4.0 and later, it is easy to tell 
which subsystems need to be autocoded and which ones don’t, because the 
ones that should not be autocoded are grayed out. 
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• If the code successfully builds then congratulations! The hardest part is over and 
the Simulink model has been converted to C code. All that remains is to check that 
the C code is functional. If it doesn’t then try to comprehend the error that the Coder 
is giving you and work out the problem. Make sure that you followed each of the 
previous steps. 
 
• A possible error that may occur is that an extrinsic function was used in the 
simulation. In brief, an extrinsic function is one that requires MATLAB to run, and 
therefore cannot be autocoded. If this occurs, try to find an autocodable equivalent 
to the extrinsic function. If not can be found then you must take up the job of coding 
the function into C yourself. Import this C function into MATLAB and replace the 
old extrinsic function where necessary. Hopefully, this will not happen too often. 
(It really takes the ‘auto’ out of ‘autocoding’ and is a fairly difficult problem to 
solve.) 
Steps: 
• While most of the Compilation step actually falls outside the realm of autocoding, 
you can manually put in preprocessor commands into the C code in order to eyeball 
and roughly make sure that the outputted values from the C code are reasonably 
accurate. Use the preprocessor commands to set up different debugging modes. 
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Each mode will let the program print out the selected variable at each time step. 
The value acquired from the program printing can then be compared to the data 
created during the Simulation, and if they seem to match then the program is 
probably on the right track. This is slightly advanced and requires some basic C 
concepts to understand. It also is not a very efficient use of time. As a result, this 
method is more or less summarized without graphical representation or in-depth 
explanation, which would not add much value for those who understand C and 
would most likely confuse those who do not know what is going on. [NOTE: Future 
Documentation Guides will go into the Compilation step of Autocoding when it is 
more refined. Currently, it is in its infancy. Also, for the future a more statistically 
sound way of doing this should be implemented. A C program that automatically 







Original: April 8, 2015  
Updated: March 10, 2017 
TO: Air Force Research Lab, University Nanosatellite Program 
FROM: Peter Schulte (GN&C Lead), Jacob Sussman (GN&C), Nolan Coulter 
(GN&C), Matthew Krumwiede (FSW) 
SUBJECT: Prox-1 Autocoding Process, Verification, and Software Integration 
 
The Simulink design of the Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) algorithms for 
Prox-1 is autocoded into C/C++ using Simulink Coder for integration with Flight Software 
(FSW). Some modifications are made to ensure the models are codable, such as avoiding 
the use of incompatible MATLAB functions. This process of GN&C algorithm 
development and integration in Simulink and later autocoding into flight software has been 
pioneered by the Orion spacecraft team at NASA’s Johnson Space Center in Houston, 
Texas [1]. 
1. Autocoding Process 
The process for autocoding from a Simulink master simulation to C code is described in 
this section based on work completed by Prox-1 team members Jacob Sussman and Meet 
Patel. This process is illustrated at a high level by the flowchart in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1: Autocoding process flowchart 
The first step in this process is documentation, which is critical for capturing detailed 
instructions and lessons learned such as best practices and how to deal with common errors. 
Next is model configuration, which involves setting a multitude of parameters within the 
Simulink model to be autocoded. Proper model configuration allows for smoother model 
simulation and code generation. Also, these configuration parameters can optimize the 
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resulting generated code to run on a specific embedded processor. Once the proper 
configuration settings are determined, they can be saved as a separate file and maintained 
using configuration control. Developers can then apply these standard configuration 
settings to any model by importing that file in Simulink. 
 
The next step is model simulation. A Simulink model such as the Prox-1 GN&C master 
simulation (MasterSim) shown in Figure 2, cannot be autocoded if it does not run properly 
in simulation. In the version of the MasterSim shown above, the Simulink diagram includes 
many GN&C components such as the Relative Orbit (RelOD) filter, Artificial Potential 
Function (APF) guidance, and torque rod (TR) controller. Gray blocks are only used for 
simulation purposes, while white blocks will be autocoded into GN&C flight software 
(FSW). For configuration control, most of the GN&C component blocks are integrated into 
the master simulation using model reference blocks. These allow each component to be 
saved as a separate Simulink file that can be integrated into multiple master simulations. 
 
 
Figure 2: A version of the Prox-1 6DOF “master simulation” 
After it is verified that the simulation model can run and provides the desired outputs, any 
blocks included from separate files as model references are copied and pasted into a single 
Simulink model to simplify the autocoding process. The model is then reconfigured so that 
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all GN&C blocks to be autocoded are combined into a single monolithic GN&C algorithm 
block as shown in Figure 3. The spacecraft plant and environment models remain in 
separate blocks and will not be autocoded. Before autocoding of the GN&C algorithms 
begins, the reconfigured simulation is run again to ensure that no changes in performance 
or outputs have been introduced by the reconfiguration process. 
 
 
Figure 3: Master sim model prepared for autocoding by creating a single GN&C block 
Once all of these changes have been made, the model is ready for code generation. Many 
errors can occur during this stage, and each error must be understood and corrected. An 
error appendix detailing common errors and how to fix them is located at the end of this 
document. After the code is generated, it must be compiled to run on the BeagleBoard XM 
flight computer. Finally, the compiled code should be run to verify that the outputs match 
those of the Simulink model.  






2. Autocoding Verification 
At the beginning of the Spring 2015 semester, Prox-1 team member Nolan Coulter was 
assigned the task to develop a process to verify the outputs created by the autocoded C 
version of the GN&C algorithms matched the corresponding outputs given by the Simulink 
program in MATLAB. This would allow the team to verify that the autocoded program 
(from here on referred to as just autocode) performs properly and there are no errors in the 
autocode. Our team used this verification process with several variations of the MasterSim 
Simulink program. With this verification process, the team was able to conclude that the 
outputs from the autocode matched the outputs produced by the Simulink program within 
a very small degree error. 
2.1 Verification Process for “MATLAB-logging” Autocode 
The process used to conclude that the autocode outputs corresponded with the Simulink 
outputs involved a series of steps that took the autocode and compared it to the Simulink 
program. When working with the autocode, the first step to be able to compare the data 
with the Simulink data is to give the proper commands to the autocode to record and log 
the outputs. After being autocoded with default settings, the program performs the basic 
calculations required to produce the outputs for each timestep; however, the autocode by 
default does not record each timestep. In the autocode, there is an “xxx_step” method that 
is used to update the outputs after each timestep. Near the end of this method, it updates 
the memory variables needed to perform the next timestep’s calculations. These variables 
are needed to verify the outputs. At the end of this method, after the memory updates, the 
code shown in Figure 4 was added to record the data after each timestep. This code creates 
an output file called “out.csv” in csv format that logs the variables of interest. 
 
 
Figure 4: C-code to generate output file 
 
After this output file is created, the file can then be used to graph the variables of interest 
over time or be directly uploaded into MATLAB for comparison. Once the required data 
is put into this format, the outputs of the autocode can be compared to the outputs from the 
Simulink program by going into the individual output arrays in MATLAB which are 
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created after running the Simulink simulation. After running the simulation, the variables 
needed for comparing can be found in the MATLAB Workspace. The correct output array 
can be determined by noting the name of the output array MATLAB uses to save the values 
of the variable to the Workspace. The name is found under the “History” tab in the settings 
window of the variable’s corresponding scope in Simulink. Figure 5 depicts the scope of 
the BurnTime variable in Simulink, while Figure 6 provides a view of the MATLAB output 
arrays and the ThrusterCMD1 array (which contains the value of BurnTime) used to verify 
the autocode BurnTime output. The left column of the ThrusterCMD1 array shows the 









Figure 6: Table of MATLAB Output Arrays (left) and ThrustCMD1 Output Array (right) 
 
If the data in the MATLAB output array is equivalent to the data in the output .csv file 
from the autocode, then the autocode performs as expected and contains no errors. This 




Figure 7: Comparison between the BurnTime output as seen in the MATLAB workspace 
(left) and the BurnTime output as seen from the autocode .csv output file (right) 
2.2 Verification Process for non-“MATLAB-logging” Autocode 
The process described in Section 2.1 was developed using autocode, that when being 
autocoded, used the option “include MATLAB logging.” This option in the autocoding 
process created a library of the variables and their values that the resultant autocode could 
access and use to initialize the timestep. This option was not used in more recent versions 
of the autocode, which means that additional steps are required to acquire the needed data 
from the autocode to compare with Simulink. 
 
In order to initialize the timestep method which then calculates the required data at each 
subsequent timestep, the initialization data from MATLAB must first be recorded 
manually. This requires observing the Simulink simulation file and the autocode to see 
which input variables are necessary to begin the timestep method. After listing the needed 
variables, the code found in Figure 8 must be added to the embedded MATLAB code 
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within Simulink corresponding to the generation of that variable. After running the 




Figure 8: MATLAB code to record a required variable (in this example BurnTimeFlag) 
Once the necessary variables’ data is logged into separate .csv files, changes in the 
autocode must be made. Going into the autocode’s header file, the variables previously 
logged manually must be defined according the same dimensions found in the MATLAB 
output array.  This header file initializes and defines the structure of the variables used 
throughout the autocoded functions. The code required to define these structures is shown 
in Figure 9.  
 
 
Figure 9: Code to define structure of input variable array in autocoded functions 
 
Once this data is given a defined structure, it can then be assigned to the proper variable 
found in the autocode. Figure 10 shows the code required to assign the data to the 
corresponding variable in the autocode’s main file. Once the necessary variables are 
defined, the autocode functions should run and produce the outputs. These files can then 
 173 
be compared to the MATLAB output arrays in a similar fashion as the “MATLAB-
logging” capable process. 
 
 
Figure 10: Block of code that assigns autocode variables to input data arrays 
2.3 Error in Data Comparisons 
While comparing the autocode outputs with the Simulink outputs, it is important to note 
that the two types of data do not match exactly. This is largely due to rounding errors in 
the .csv file. Looking at the .csv file containing the data of the autocode outputs, for certain 
variables such as the relative velocity vector, the values appear as -0.00000X while the 
corresponding value in the MATLAB output array is has more significant figures and a 
more precise value. The .csv file rounds these excessive significant figures. However, these 
small rounding errors can be disregarded since the two output files agree to several 
significant figures.  
2.4 Autocoding Verification Conclusions 
The process developed to verify that the autocode outputs were equivalent to the Simulink 
and MATLAB outputs was successful. The outputs from the autocode matched the outputs 
from Simulink simulation within the aforementioned degree of error. However, it is 
important to distinguish that this verification process is an open-loop system and does not 
test a closed-loop dynamic model. The inputs fed into the autocode are simply saved values 
from the Simulink code. This means that at each timestep, there is an already defined input 
used to calculate the corresponding output. The output from the previous timestep is not 
fed back into the next timestep through spacecraft plant and dynamics models because 
these models are not autocoded. If the output from a previous timestep was then used to 
calculate the input for the next, this would be a closed loop system. In the process described 
in this section, the inputs are independent of the outputs from the previous timestep. With 
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a closed loop process, the necessary Spacecraft Hardware Plant and Environment Models 
would need to be autocoded in addition to the GN&C algorithms. Although a closed-loop 
test was not performed, it was verified that the C code provides the same results as the 
Simulink models at each individual open-loop timestep. 
3. Integration with Flight Software 
After the C code has been generated for use on the BeagleBoard, it must be integrated with 
FSW.  In the current understanding of the Prox-1 GN&C and FSW teams, the GN&C code 
will be integrated as a monolithic sub-routine that is called during each timestep. This 
process is illustrated in Figure 11, which shows that external variables are collected by 
FSW from various sensors (1) and sent into the GN&C code (2), which then operates in 
various modes. GN&C returns commands to FSW (3), which then distributes those 
commands to actuator hardware such as the Propulsion and Attitude Determination and 
Control Subsystem (ADCS) microcontrollers. In (2) and (3) FSW and GN&C will also 
exchange mode logic variables, such as a command to enter ProxOpsMode from the ground 
or an indication from GN&C that a Guidance command has been successfully executed.  
 
Figure 11: GN&C/FSW interface illustration 
(Original Spring 2015 text; applicable when Prox-1 was using the Core Flight Executive) 
 
The actual mechanism of integration between GN&C and FSW involves the Core Flight 
Executive (CFE), which is code produced by NASA that greatly facilitates in the 
production of flight software [2]. Once the C code is generated from Simulink, all files are 
transferred to the Prox-1 CFE github repository. Under the apps directory, which is located 
in FSW/cFE, a new gnc_app directory is created, and all the auto-coded files are relocated 
here. The structure of the gnc_app directory is shown in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12: gnc_app directory structure 
Most of the code is transferred to the src directory, while the header files that have 
important information for other apps are placed in the platform_inc directory. Once the 
files are relocated, a new C file is created, gnc_app.c, along with a header file, gnc_app.h. 
The new C file follows CFE protocol for creating an app. The main function of gnc_app.c 
listens for messages from other applications (mainly Prox_app, the master application for 
Prox-1 FSW). The messages will contain a data type, along with a command ID that tells 
GN&C what input the data corresponds to (message ID’s are defined in the platform_inc 
subdirectory). The main function also has logic that determines if all thirteen inputs 
necessary for GN&C to run have been received. If not, the main function continues on a 
loop. 
 
Once all the inputs are received, gnc_app.c calls MasterSubsystem0.c, which is the main 
auto-coded C file from Simulink. The Master Subsystem takes the inputs and calculates an 
output structure.  The output structure is forwarded back to the main application of 
gnc_app.c, and then sent via a software bus to other applications.   
 
To determine how to compile the application, MasterSubsystem0.c and its dependencies 
were all compiled outside of CFE, independently, alongside a tester file ert_main.c. It was 
discovered that the C flag –lm is required for compilation. With this information, 
compilation of gnc_app with CFE was very straightforward. The makefile within the 















C flag necessary for compilation. Everything else was taken care of by the CFE, so that 
when the whole of Flight Software was compiled, gnc_app compiled as well. 
Testing of the FSW/GNC integration will be performed through an external daemon server 
that poses as a serial device interacting with CFE. Since the flight computer will not receive 
actual relevant data from hardware until it is in orbit, the daemon simulator is necessary to 
test the performance of GN&C in an open-loop manner. The daemon server will obtain 
“fake” input data from text files. The fake inputs are collected from the original Simulink 
code, which has a hardware simulation module. These fake inputs are fed through the serial 
port one by one, interacting first with the serial app, then going through the main Prox_app, 
then finally making their way to gnc_app. The first test will involve making sure that the 
autocoded GN&C function does not execute the first iteration until it receives all thirteen 
inputs. The next test will involve running GN&C through a certain number of iterations 
while comparing the output structures to the outputs in the original Simulink model outputs 
using a process similar to the one presented in Section 2.  
 
Finally, a closed-loop test will be performed using hardware-in-the-loop simulation with 
the FSW on the BeagleBoard connected to the Spacecraft Plant and Environment models 
in Simulink via MATLAB’s xPC Target toolbox. This test will verify that the completed 
gnc_app within the FSW code performs in the same manner as the GN&C algorithms in 
Simulink using the same Simulink simulation plant and environment models. 
 
(Updated Spring 2017 text after Prox-1 abandoned cFE in favor of a custom executive) 
 
The algorithms, initially after the autocoding process, are stored in a main C file as 
hundreds of individual functions.  Within this C file, four main functions (here called step 
functions) handle the operation of the algorithms, and thus act as the main functions of the 
autocode.  For each time step, a step function is called, with the hardware variables (sun 
sensor data, accelerometer data, etc.) as inputs.  The step function then determines which 
algorithms to run, based on the elapsed time of the mission.  All four step functions must 
work together in unison at any given time step, such that the entire system resembles the 
Simulink model as closely as possible.  
  
The goal of the integration process is to retrieve the hardware variables from flight software 
and pass them into all four step functions synchronously at each time interval.  The outputs 
of the model must then be read and sent to the hardware as soon as possible, ideally within 
the same time step.  To facilitate this integration process, a C file was created in the flight 
code directory that was responsible for handling the GN&C step functions.  Called gnc.c, 
this file first defines all of the flight parameters that are not hard-coded into the model.  
This includes variables such as moments of inertia, mass, dimensions.  It also includes 
variables which are subject to change.  The file therefore contains a function, which, if 
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called from the main flight code (due to a ground command), would change the value of 
the parameter and update the system.  This allows for real-time parameter tuning. 
   
After defining the parameters, the gnc.c file has an initial function which is called by the 
main flight code on startup.  This function essentially creates the memory blocks which 
will store all of GN&C’s data structures, and then populates them with the appropriate 
initial values.  It also creates mutexes.  Mutexes are useful for accessing the same variable 
from two different synchronous processes.  If one process locks a mutex, it can perform a 
line of code that can’t be accessed by another process until the mutex is unlocked.  This 
avoids the essential problem of different threads trying to read and write to the same 
memory block at the same time (which would result in data corruption). 
  
The “main” function of gnc.c is essentially a loop that runs every 0.1 seconds.  During each 
iteration of the loop, the inputs for GN&C are retrieved.  Most inputs are simply pulled 
from the flight code, which is already set up to retrieve hardware states via C&DH.  Some 
inputs, however, are liable to change depending on how much time has passed, or on what 
state the satellite is in.  For example, during detumble, certain inputs to GN&C must be 
manually set off (more information regarding the specifics of GN&C inputs can be found 
in other documentation).  Therefore, the chief role of this main function is to use a series 
of logical checks, based on global state and mode variables, as well as the elapsed time of 
the mission, to determine the settings of certain inputs.  After all inputs are obtained, they 
are stored inside of GN&C’s global inputs structure using mutexes. 
   
A separate function in gnc.c, called the run loop, runs separately from the main loop.  It 
also runs every 0.1 seconds.  At each iteration, the inputs structure is passed to each of the 
four step functions.  The output of the step functions are stored in the outputs structure.  
The run loop then reads variables from the outputs structure and passes them to the main 
flight code, which are then sent to the appropriate hardware modules for command 
actuation. 
 
In the main flight code, two pthreads are created at execution (after the startup routine).  
Pthreads are essentially sub-processes that can run independent of the main flight code.  
The first pthread calls the main loop of gnc.c, while the second pthread calls the run loop.  
At this point in the code, GN&C will start running in the background.  This method of 
integration makes it much easier for engineers working on the main flight code to interface 
with GN&C.  For example, each time Flight Software takes a hardware reading, it must 
simply store the corresponding values in the input structure of GN&C.  The subprocess 
will take care of everything else.  Likewise, to send an appropriate command to a piece of 
hardware, Flight Software must simply read the corresponding value from the output 
structure.     
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Appendix: Common Autocoding Errors 
This section will show examples of common errors that occur during the autocoding 
process and how to fix them. When referenced, a “MasterSim” is a term for the Simulink 
file that is your master simulation, which contains all GN&C algorithms, spacecraft plant, 
and environment models. Errors shown list specific variable/function/model/path names 
but when debugging your own MasterSim the errors will be customized to your design. 
 
Good rules of thumb to help with deal with errors: 
1. Save often. You never know when MATLAB is going to throw a fit and you 
suddenly lose all of your unsaved work. 
2. Make sure all Paths and proper initialization files are set up correctly. 
3. Before the building phase, create a MasterSim which contains every component in 
one giant model as opposed to linking to external files. While this is a tedious 
process, it will prevent many future headaches. 
4. Make sure your MasterSim can compile before you even try to build it. If it can’t 
even run in MATLAB why would it run in C? 
Initialization Errors 
These errors occur because the initialization files (MATLAB scripts that must be run before 
the Simulink model is run) are not behaving properly. 
 
“Undefined function or variable 'RP'. 
Error in SpacecraftPlant_EnvironmentModel_Init (line 108) 
P = (RE + RP)*(1+e_LS); %Semi-latus rectum (m)” 
 
If there is more than one initialization file it is standard practice for one file to be the 
‘primary’ initialization file. This primary .m file will then usually call all other necessary 
initialization files. When working under this design paradigm, it is therefore only necessary 
to call the primary file. If you run the wrong file mistaking it for the primary one or even 
run a secondary initialization file after already running the primary one, you may get this 
error. Secondary initialization files are written to assume they will be called by the primary 
file, meaning running them on their own will usually fail due lack of access to all of the 
defined primary variables. 
 
“License checkout failed. 
License Manager Error -4 
Maximum number of users for Aerospace_Toolbox reached. 
Try again later. 
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To see a list of current users use the lmstat utility or contact your License 
Administrator. 
 









Licensing error: -4,132. 
 
Error in HIL_6DOFMasterSim4_Init_TACTest (line 149) 
q0_P1 = angle2quat(0,1,0); %initially point toward target” 
 
The model was written with a Mathworks toolbox that you do not have access to. In this 
case it is the Aerospace Toolbox. To prevent this error from happening either make 
absolute sure everyone in the team is developing on the same environment or try to 
minimize use of toolbox functions in favor of writing custom versions yourself. To fix this 
example for instance you can rewrite line 149 as follows: 
 
Q0_P1 = vector2quat([0;1;0]); 
 
As long as you actually write the vector2quat function to be functionally equivalent to its 
toolbox’s counterpart, the initialization file should be able to run. This newly written 
function however is probably slower to execute than the toolbox version since it is not 
designed for efficiency by MathWorks. Be careful of replacing too many toolbox functions. 
It can make your code harder to debug and can slow development considerably. In an 
industry like Aerospace if you can’t afford a required software license, you probably can’t 
afford launching satellites in the first place. 
 
“Undefined function 'ROT3' for input arguments of type 'double'. 
 





Error in HIL_6DOFMasterSim5_Init_TACTest (line 268) 
SpacecraftPlant_EnvironmentModel_Init;” 
 
This error was caused by an initialization file which referenced a function located in a 
model not currently in the Path. To fix this, simply add the offending model to the Path and 
run the initialization file again. 
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Compilation Errors 
These errors occur when attempting to run the MasterSim. Failure at this step prevents you 
from moving on towards code generation. 
 
“Model 'Detumble_Controller_Model3_2012a' not found.” 
 
In this case, a certain model (the Detumble Controller) is not connected to the MasterSim. 
To fix this, locate the model in MasterSim. It should be blocked in red. Double click on 
this block and point Simulink to where the model is located. When the popup box appears 
asking to add the file’s location to the Path click ‘Add to Path’. 
 
“Error evaluating expression 't0' for 'StartTime' specified in the Configuration 
Parameters dialog for block diagram 'Detumble_Controller_Model3_2012a': 
Undefined function or variable 't0'.” 
 
Did you run the initialization file before running the MasterSim? This error can occur if a 
user is so hasty to compile the MasterSim that they forget to run the initialization files first. 
 
“Undefined function or variable 'v_desired'. The first assignment to a local variable 
determines its class. Function 'P1 - Guidance (FOUO)/p1_r2r_apf_v2 (FOUO)' 
(#135.3666.3675), line 93, column 17: "v_desired" Launch diagnostic report.” 
 
When preparing a model for autocoding or simply when rearranging a model for aesthetic 
purposes in Simulink, you may accidentally break one of the MasterSim’s connection lines. 
To remedy this, locate where the undefined function/variable is in the context of the entire 
MasterSim and then trace the model to the offending location, fixing any broken 
connections lines along the way. 
 
“Size mismatch (size [3 x 1] ~= size [3 x 3]). Function 'P1 - Guidance 
(FOUO)/p1_r2r_apf_v2 (FOUO)' (#135.2475.2529), line 55, column 32: 
"((rDc_trans*P*rDc)-1)*Q*rCt-(rCt_trans*Q*rCt)*P*(-rDc)"” 
 
This error can occur if there is a broken connection just like the previous error. An 
undefined variable used in a matrix declaration can change a matrix’s size and throw off 
the rest of a model that anticipates a different size. This also could simply be a coding 
mistake, where the programmer messed up on declaring a matrix of the proper size. 
 
“File…5update\HIL_6DOFMasterSim5_Init_TaCTest.m is not found in the current 
folder or on the MATLAB path. 
 
To run this file, you can either change the MATLAB current folder or add its folder 
to the MATLAB path.” 
 
This error will occur if your current working directory for MATLAB is not the one the 
MasterSim is located in or if the MasterSim’s folder is not in the Path. In the pop-up that 
follows this error click ‘Change to folder’ or ‘Add folder’ to remedy this.  
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 “MATLAB has encountered an internal problem and needs to close. 
The unsaved information you were working on may be lost. We are sorry for the 
inconvenience. 
Click Never Send to disable sending information to MathWorks (saved in 
preference). 
Click Send to send this information to Mathworks. 
Click End Now to close MATLAB now. 
Click Attempt to Continue to try to return briefly to MATLAB. You might be able to 
save your work. 
Do not continue your MATLAB session after trying to save your work. Further 
operations are unreliable. 
You must close and restart MATLAB in order for the program to operate correctly. 
Click Details to see what will be sent to MathWorks if the Send button is clicked.” 
 
Sometimes compilation will result in an ultimate error that forces you to shut down your 
working session and restart. 
 
Clicking on Details usually results in a file telling you that an Access violation has been 
detected. This can have happened for a number of reasons. A simple example would be if 
you had a mismatched GOTO tag that didn’t have a proper pair. To prevent issues with 
GOTO tags in general you can bus every variable into the required model. This requires 
more effort but is generally safer and results in less issues during the building phase. 
Building Errors 
These are errors that occur when building the compiled model into C code. Most building 
errors occur from either not having MATLAB properly set up, not compiling the 
MasterSim in the form of one complete file, or not ridding your simulation of extrinsic 
functions. 
 
“An installed compiler was not detected. Certain simulation modes, as well as host-
based coder builds require that a compiler be installed. Please install one of the 
supported compilers for this release as listed at: 
http://www.mathworks.com/support/compilers/R2014b/win64.html MATLAB must 
be restarted after the compiler is installed.” 
 
As the error tells you, the proper compiler is not installed. Make sure you have the right 
compiler and then continue. 
 
“Configuration component 'RTWSystemTargetFile' of model 
'HIL_6DOF_MasterSim4_APF_RelOD_TA' and configuration component 
'RTWSystemTargetFile' of model 'ImageGen_SensorModel_v3' are not 
compatible. The error message returned by the comparison function is: The 
parameter setting for 'RTWSystemTargetFile' must be the same for all models in 
the model reference hierarchy” 
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If you try to build a model that contains externally-linked models there are a whole slew 
of problems that can occur. This is an example of MATLAB telling you directly that the 
configuration setting for two models are incompatible. Oftentimes, the Diagnostic Viewer 
is much less telling and you might spend an hour or more researching and debugging the 
error only to end up finding out that what caused the issue was a simple difference between 
configuration settings for the two models. This is why it is a good paradigm to either 
develop all models with the same configuration parameters from the get-go or to at the very 
least create a version of the MasterSim that replaces a link to an external model with the 
model itself. 
 
“Error in Model block 
'HIL_6DOF_MasterSim4_APF_RelOD_TA/NotocodeSubsystem/Prox-1 
Hardware and Spacecraft Plant/Prox-1 Hardware 
Models/Detumble_Controller_Model': the 'Application lifespan' must match 
between the parent model 'HIL_6DOF_MasterSim4_APF_RelOD_TA' and the 
referenced model 'TorqueRod_Hardware'.  The parent model has a value of '1.0', 
while the referenced model has a value of 'Inf'.  To change this parameter, go to 
the 'Optimization' page of the Configuration Parameters dialog.” 
 
This is another example of an error caused by dealing with externally-linked models. With 
this error luckily the Diagnostic Viewer tells you how to fix the problem. 
 
“The extrinsic function 'frame2im' is not available for standalone code generation. 
It must be eliminated for stand-alone code to be generated. It could not be 
eliminated because its outputs appear to influence the calling function. Fix this 
error by not using 'frame2im' or by ensuring that its outputs are unused.” 
 
This is an error caused by your model containing an extrinsic function. In MATLAB, an 
extrinsic function is one which requires MATLAB to run. Since the function requires 
MATLAB’s overhead it is not available for standalone code generation. Since the entire 
point of autocoding is to reduce the overhead of a model without affecting its behavior you 
should eliminate every output-affecting extrinsic function from the MasterSim and replace 
it with an autocodeable variant. 
 
This can be more difficult that it appears at first. While some extrinsic functions are 
relatively simple and can be avoided by adding slightly more long-winded code, some 
extrinsic functions (especially ones related to image processing) may take days to work 
around. In these cases, you should read up on as much of the documentation for the 
extrinsic function as possible and make sure you fully understand how the function works. 
Then you have the choice of either: 
a) Writing a MATLAB function that mimics the extrinsic function. This may be the 
easier option but it can result in slower code. 
b) Writing C code that mimics the extrinsic function and either manually inserting 
this code into already generated code or importing the C function into MATLAB 
as a .s file and referencing this function instead of the original extrinsic one. 
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Whichever way you choose, note that you should rigorously test your self-designed 
function in order to make sure it is equal to Mathworks’ version in every conceivable 
scenario the function would be put through. 
Final Note 
Just because your final C code was produced without throwing any errors in MATLAB 
does not necessarily mean your code is error-free. It would be wise to test the C code 
independently using the process defined in Section 2 to determine if in fact your model 






APPENDIX B: UAV NERVOUS SYSTEM CONNECTION DIAGRAM 
 
This appendix is referenced in Section 3.6 and shows the electrical connections for the upgraded UAV Nervous System. This version 
of the nervous system contains two suites of sensors for two separate arms of a rotary wing UAV. Each arm of the copter has a Teensy 
microprocessor (using Arduino code), an MPU-6050 accelerometer, a DS18B20 temperature sensor, and a 90A AttoPilot voltage and 
current sense breakout board. One Teensy is powered by a 5V Universal Battery Elimination Circuit (UBEC) connection to the copter’s 
lithium polymer battery, and the second Teensy is powered by a USB connection to the MeegoPad compute stick, which is also powered 
by a 5V UBEC connection to the lithium polymer battery. Note that only one Teensy processor is connected to the MeegoPad via USB, 







APPENDIX C: MARS SAMPLE RETURN  
SUBSYSTEM TAXONOMY 
 
This appendix is referenced in Section 4.5.1 and contains the complete subsystem 
taxonomy for the Sample Return Orbiter (SRO). It is shown in text format for readability. 
This includes components for the Rendezvous OS Capture, Telecom, Flight Software, 
Command & Data Handling, Guidance, Navigation, & Control, Propulsion, Electrical 
Power, and Thermal Control subsystems. Note that the SRO is still in the preliminary 
design phase, so these components are listed in a generic and functional way because 
specific components have not been selected for the mission. 
 
Ground Support Systems 
Mars Ascent Vehicle (MAV) 
Orbiting Sample container (OS) 
Space-Based Support Systems 








Capture Door Closure Fault 
 Flight Software 
  
Fault Protection software 
     VML Sequencing 
 
Command & Data Handling 
  
Flight Processor 
  Solid State Recorder 
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  Data Busses 
 Propulsion 
    Reaction Control System (RCS) Thrusters 
  Solar Electric Propulsion (SEP) Thrusters 
  Propellant Tanks 
 Electrical Power 
  
Solar Arrays & Gimbals 
  Batteries 
  Power Distribution & Busses 
 Thermal Control 
  Thermal Sensors 
  Heaters 
 
Guidance, Navigation, & Control (GN&C) 
  GN&C Mode/Decision Logic 
  
GN&C Software Components 
   
Attitude GN&C Software 
    Attitude Determination Algorithms 
    Attitude Guidance Algorithms 
     OS Mosaicing Algorithm 
     Attitude Constraints 
    Attitude Control Algorithms 
   Translational GN&C Software 
    Orbit Determination Algorithms 
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     Image Processing Algorithms 
     Orbit Determination Filters 
    Orbit Control Algorithms 
    Orbit Guidance Algorithms 
     Solar Electric Propulsion Inertial Guidance 
     Rendezvous Relative Guidance 
  
GN&C Hardware Components 
   
Attitude Determination Sensors 
    Inertial Measurement Unit 
    Star Tracker 
    Sun Sensors 
   Attitude Control Actuators 
    Reaction Wheels 
    RCS Thrusters (propulsion) 
   Rendezvous Sensors 
    Narrow Angle Camera (NAC) [hawk] 
    Medium Angle Camera (MAC) [dog] 
    Wide Angle Camera (WAC) [fish] 
    Long-Wave Infrared (LWIR) 
    LIDAR 
 Rendezvous OS Capture System (ROCS) 
  OS Sensors 
      Laser Curtain 
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   OS Confirmation Sensor 
   Force/Torque Sensors 
  Flashlight 
  Capture Volume (container for capturing OS) 
  Capture Door 
  Reorientation Hardware 
  Break-the-Chain Hardware 




APPENDIX D: FULL FAULT TREE FOR MARS SAMPLE RETURN 
TERMINAL RENDEZVOUS AND CAPTURE PHASE 
This appendix is referenced in Section 4.5.1 and lists the complete GN&C fault tree for the 
Mars Sample Return autonomous terminal rendezvous and capture phase. A text format is 
used here for the fault tree rather than a graphical format to improve readability. Faults in 
bold were selected to be examined in greater detail, as described in Appendix E. 
 
Failure to Capture the OS 
 
Fault During Approach 
  
Relative Orbit Determination Fault 
   
Rendezvous Sensor Data Fault 
    
Sensor Hardware Fault 
     
Sensor Loses Power 
     
Sensor Settings Incorrect 
     
Solid-State Recorder Malfunction 
    
Sensor Background Noise 
     
Radiation-Induced Noise 
     
Temperature-Induced Noise 
          Stray Light Glint 
    
OS Passes Too Quickly Through Imager FOV 
     
SRO Angular Rates Too Great 
     
OS Relative Velocity Too Great 
    
Sensor FOV Impaired 
     
Lens Fogged Due to Outgassing 
     
Spacecraft Component in FOV 
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Debris in FOV 
    
Poor Conditions for OS Tracking 
     
OS Surface Properties Unfavorable 
     
OS Blends Into Background 
     
OS in Eclipse or Shadow (visual only) 
     
Phase Angle Unfavorable 
     
Flashlight Malfunction (visual only) 
    
LIDAR/IR Sensor Faults 
        No OS Data from Sensors 
   
Orbit Determination Computation Fault 
    
Image Processing Fault 
    
Navigation Software Fault 
    
Mosaicing Algorithm Misses OS 
    
Orbit Perturbations Differ from Models 
     
OS Outgassing Perturbs Orbit 
          SRO Plume Impingement on OS 
     
Atmospheric Drag Perturbs Relative Orbit 
     
Other Orbit Perturbation Mismodeling 
    
Incorrect Model Parameters (i.e. OS optical properties) 
    
Ephemeris or Timing Fault 
    
Filter Does Not Converge 
  
Guidance & Control Fault 
   
Attitude Fault 
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Degraded Attitude Knowledge 
     
Inertial Measurement Unit Fault 
     
     No Data Output 
     Reset/Excessive Reset 
     Bias/Scale Factor Offset 
     Measurement Drift 
     
     
Star Tracker Fault 
     
    No Output  
    
      Bias/Incorrect Output  
     
    Excessive Current Draw  
     
    Optics Contamination  
     
    Optics Coating Degradation  
     
    False/Intermittent Star ID  
              Temporary Lock-Up  
     
    Noisy Measurements  
     
    Sun Sensor Fault 
          Attitude Filter Does Not Converge 
    
Degraded Attitude Control 
     
Reaction Wheel Fault 
     
    Wheel Stuck/Seized/Not Rotating  
     
    Increased Drag/Friction  
     
    Excessive Current Draw  
     
    Excessive Vibration  
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    Tachometer Fault  
     
    Drive Electronics Fault  
              Wheel Momentum Saturated  
     
Reaction Control System Thruster Fault 
     
    Thruster Fails to Actuate  
     
    Thruster Stuck On  
     
    Tank heater fault  
     
    Propellant line freezing  
   
Trajectory Fault 
 
    
Maneuver Fault 
          Incorrect Timing, Direction, or Delta-V for Burn   
          Deadband Violation Does Not Trigger Manuever   
    
Degraded Translational Control 
    
Unable to place OS inside capture cone 
          OS not aligned with capture cone   
          Rotation Rate Too High   
          Relative Velocity Too High   
   




   
Spacecraft Reboot 
 
   
Unable to Meet Conditions that Allow Transfer to a Key State 
        Tolerances on parameters too tight 
    
Unexpected configuration 
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Telemetry Reporting Fault 
    
Logical Error in Sequence 
   
Premature Entry into any State 
    
Logical Error in Sequence 
    
Sequencing Software Coding Fault 
      Ground Command Halts or Unloads Sequence 
   
Incorrect Config File Version Loaded 
 
Fault During Capture 
 
  
Capture Door Closure Fault 
 
   
Door Close Timing Fault (Early/Late Closure) 
      Door Close Signal Does Not Activate 
   
Door Mechanism Fault 
 
  
Unexpected OS Dynamics 
 
      OS Spin Rate Exceeds Capture Requirement 
   
OS Energy Exceeds Capture Capability 
   
OS Impacts ROCS Components 
  
Capture Detection Sensor Fault 
   
Door Sensor Fault 
 
   
OS Confirmation Sensor Fault 
   
Force/Torque Sensor Fault 
      Sun Interference/Spoofing 
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APPENDIX E: PRELIMINARY MSR FAULT PROTECTION 
STRATEGIES AND REQUIREMENTS 
 
This appendix is referenced in Section 4.5.2 and lists preliminary fault protection strategies 
and requirements for the selected faults from the Mars Sample Return fault tree in 
Appendix D. The selected faults are difficult to detect, diagnose, or respond to in a safe 
and timely manner and have high consequences for autonomous rendezvous and capture. 
 
 Relative Orbit Determination Faults 
 No OS Data From Sensors 
 
o The flight system shall stop maneuvers if no OS data is received 
from the rendezvous sensors during the passive abort region (Zone 
1) of autonomous rendezvous. 
o The flight system shall abort from autonomous rendezvous if no OS 
data is received from the rendezvous sensors during the active 
abort region (Zone 2). 
o The flight system shall restore measurements of OS position within 
<30 seconds> (TBR) if no OS data is received from the rendezvous 
sensors during the unavoidable intercept region (Zone 3). 
o The flight system shall restore measurements of OS position within 
<15 minutes> (TBR) if no OS data is received from the rendezvous 






 Stray Light Glint 
 
o The flight system shall stop maneuvers if stray light glint on the 
rendezvous sensors negatively impacts the ability to estimate the 
OS relative orbit during the passive abort region (Zone 1) of 
autonomous rendezvous. 
o The flight system shall abort from autonomous rendezvous if stray 
light glint on the rendezvous sensors negatively impacts the ability 
to estimate the OS relative orbit during the active abort region 
(Zone 2). 
o The flight system shall perform autonomous rendezvous in the 
presence of stray light glint on the rendezvous sensors during the 
unavoidable intercept region (Zone 3) 
o The flight system shall preserve <40%> (TBR) of nominal relative 
orbit estimation performance in the presence of stray light glint 
during all other subphases of autonomous rendezvous. 
 OS Plume Impingement Modeling Fault 
 
o The flight system shall stop maneuvers if plume impingement 
causes unmodeled OS dynamics during the passive abort region 
(Zone 1) of autonomous rendezvous. 
o The flight system shall abort from autonomous rendezvous if plume 
impingement causes unmodeled OS dynamics during the active 
abort region (Zone 2).  
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o The flight system shall perform autonomous rendezvous in the 
presence of unmodeled OS dynamics caused by plume 
impingement during the unavoidable intercept region (Zone 3). 
o The flight system shall perform autonomous rendezvous in the 
presence of unmodeled OS dynamics caused by plume 
impingement during all other subphases. 
 Filter Does Not Converge 
o The flight system shall stop maneuvers if the relative orbit filter 
does not converge during the passive abort region (Zone 1) of 
autonomous rendezvous. 
o The flight system shall abort from autonomous rendezvous if the 
relative orbit filter does not converge during the active abort 
region (Zone 2). 
o The flight system shall restore relative orbit filter estimation within 
<30 seconds> (TBR) if the relative orbit filter does not converge 
during the unavoidable intercept region (Zone 3) of autonomous 
rendezvous. 
o The flight system shall restore relative orbit filter estimation within 
<15 minutes> (TBR) if the filter does not converge during all other 
subphases of autonomous rendezvous. 
 Attitude Determination & Control Faults 
 Gyro Bias/Scale Factor 
 
o The flight system shall preserve <60%> (TBR) of nominal maneuver 
performance in the presence of a gyro bias or scale factor during the 
passive abort region (Zone 1) of autonomous rendezvous. 
o The flight system shall perform autonomous rendezvous in the 
presence of a gyro bias or scale factor during the active abort region 
(Zone 2). 
o The flight system shall perform autonomous rendezvous in the 
presence of a gyro bias or scale factor during the unavoidable 
intercept region (Zone 3). 
o The flight system shall preserve <40%> (TBR) of nominal maneuver 
performance in the presence of a gyro bias or scale factor during all 
other subphases of autonomous rendezvous. 
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o The flight system shall stop maneuvers in the presence of a gyro bias 
or scale factor during autonomous capture. 
 Star Tracker Temporary Lockup 
 
o The flight system shall preserve <60%> (TBR) of nominal maneuver 
performance in the presence of a temporary star tracker lockup during 
the passive abort region (Zone 1) of autonomous rendezvous. 
o The flight system shall perform autonomous rendezvous in the 
presence of a temporary star tracker lockup during the active abort 
region (Zone 2). 
o The flight system shall perform autonomous rendezvous in the 
presence of a temporary star tracker lockup during the unavoidable 
intercept region (Zone 3). 
o The flight system shall restore maneuver capability within <15 
minutes> (TBR) in the presence of a star tracker temporary lockup 
during all other subphases of autonomous rendezvous. 
o The flight system shall stop maneuvers in the presence of a star tracker 
temporary lockup during autonomous capture. 
  Attitude Filter Does Not Converge 
 
o The flight system shall stop maneuvers if the attitude filter does not 
converge during the passive abort region (Zone 1) of autonomous 
rendezvous. 
o The flight system shall abort from autonomous rendezvous if the 
relative orbit filter does not converge during the active abort region 
(Zone 2). 
o The flight system shall restore attitude filter estimation within <30 
seconds> (TBR) if the attitude filter does not converge during the 
unavoidable intercept region (Zone 3) of autonomous rendezvous. 
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o The flight system shall restore attitude filter estimation within <15 
minutes> (TBR) if the attitude filter does not converge during all other 
subphases of autonomous rendezvous. 
o The flight system shall stop maneuvers if the attitude filter does not 
converge during autonomous capture. 
 Reaction Wheel Momentum Saturated 
 
o The flight system shall preserve <60%> (TBR) of nominal maneuver 
performance in the presence of a reaction wheel momentum saturation 
during the passive abort region (Zone 1) of autonomous rendezvous. 
o The flight system shall perform autonomous rendezvous in the 
presence of a reaction wheel momentum saturation during the active 
abort region (Zone 2). 
o The flight system shall perform autonomous rendezvous in the 
presence of a reaction wheel momentum saturation during the 
unavoidable intercept region (Zone 3). 
o The flight system shall restore maneuver capability within <15 
minutes> (TBR) in the presence of a reaction wheel momentum 
saturation during standby in a holding location in autonomous 
rendezvous. 
o The flight system shall preserve <40%> (TBR) of nominal maneuver 
performance in the presence of a reaction wheel momentum saturation 
during all other subphases of autonomous rendezvous. 
o The flight system shall perform autonomous capture in the presence of 







 Trajectory Maneuver Faults 
 OS Dynamics Exceed Capture Requirements 
 
o The flight system shall perform autonomous rendezvous even if the 
projected (to time of capture) OS spin rate exceeds 3 RPM, relative 
velocity exceeds 5 cm/s, or lateral offset exceeds 10 cm during the 
unavoidable intercept region (Zone 3). 
o The flight system shall abort from autonomous rendezvous if the 
projected (to time of capture) OS spin rate exceeds 3 RPM, relative 
velocity exceeds 5 cm/s, or lateral offset exceeds 10 cm during all 
other subphases. 
 Incorrect Timing/Direction/Delta-V 
 
o The flight system shall preserve <60%> (TBR) of nominal trajectory 
performance in the presence of a trajectory maneuver error during the 
passive abort region (Zone 1) of autonomous rendezvous. 
o The flight system shall perform autonomous rendezvous in the 
presence of a trajectory maneuver error during the active abort region 
(Zone 2). 
o The flight system shall perform autonomous in the presence of a 
trajectory maneuver error during the unavoidable intercept region 
(Zone 3). 
o The flight system shall preserve <40%> (TBR) of nominal trajectory 
performance in the presence of a trajectory maneuver error during all 




 Deadband Violation Does Not Trigger Maneuver 
 
o The flight system shall preserve <60%> (TBR) of nominal trajectory 
performance in the presence of a deadband violation error during the 
passive abort region (Zone 1) of autonomous rendezvous. 
o The flight system shall perform autonomous rendezvous in the 
presence of a deadband violation error during the active abort region 
(Zone 2). 
o The flight system shall perform autonomous rendezvous in the 
presence of a deadband violation error during the unavoidable 
intercept region (Zone 3). 
o The flight system shall preserve <40%> (TBR) of nominal trajectory 
performance in the presence of a deadband violation error during all 
other subphases of autonomous rendezvous. 
 Sequencing Faults 
 Tolerances on Transition Parameters Too Tight 
 
o The flight system shall restore nominal sequencing within <10 
minutes> (TBR) in the presence of a sequence parameter tolerance 
error during the passive abort region (Zone 1) of autonomous 
rendezvous. 
o The flight system shall abort from autonomous rendezvous in the 
presence of a sequence parameter tolerance error during the active 
abort region (Zone 2). 
o The flight system shall perform autonomous rendezvous in the 
presence of a sequence parameter tolerance error during the 
unavoidable intercept region (Zone 3). 
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o The flight system shall perform autonomous capture after the OS 
enters the capture volume in the presence of a sequence parameter 
tolerance error. 
 Ground Command Halts or Unloads Sequence 
 
o The flight system shall restore nominal sequencing within <10 
minutes> (TBR) in the presence of a sequencing ground command 
error during the passive abort region (Zone 1) of autonomous 
rendezvous. 
o The flight system shall abort from autonomous rendezvous in the 
presence of a sequencing ground command error during the active 
abort region (Zone 2). 
o The flight system shall perform autonomous rendezvous in the 
presence of a sequencing ground command error during the 
unavoidable intercept region (Zone 3). 
o The flight system shall restore nominal sequencing within <15 
minutes> (TBR) in the presence of a sequencing ground command 
error during all other subphases of autonomous rendezvous. 
o The flight system shall perform autonomous capture in the presence of 
a sequencing ground command error. 
 Capture Faults 
 Door Close Signal Does Not Activate 
 
o The flight system shall restore capture door close capability within 
<10 seconds> (TBR) in the presence of a capture door close signal 
error during autonomous capture. 
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 Sun Interference/Spoofing of Laser Curtain 
 
o The flight system shall maintain <60%> (TBR) of nominal laser 
curtain sensor detection in the presence of sun interference or 
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